输电网投资规划的Nash均衡分析(一)——纯策略Nash均衡的分析  

NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN THE GAME OF TRANSMISSION EXPANSION Part One Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium

作　　者：王成山[1] 吉兴全[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学电气自动化与能源工程学院,天津市300072

出　　处：《电力系统自动化》2002年第19期11-15,共5页Automation of Electric Power Systems

基　　金：国家重点基础研究专项经费资助项目(G19980 2 0 30 7);国家自然科学基金资助项目 (5 0 1770 2 2 );高等学校优秀青年教师教学研究奖励计划资助项目~~

摘　　要：电力系统引入市场机制后 ,输电网的投资具有分散化的趋势 ,同时 ,各参与者的投资策略又相互影响、相互依存。正确分析各潜在投资者的行为 ,对投资主体和系统运行管理部门的决策具有重要意义。文中以非合作静态博弈理论为基础 ,对输电投资博弈进行了定义 ,通过运行模拟计算各种策略组合下博弈各方的收益 ,进而求得 Nash均衡点 ,为参与者的投资决策提供了依据。研究结果表明 ,面对众多的潜在投资者及其可能的投资行为 ,参与者总是以自身利益最大化为目标 。In today's power market environment, transmission investment decision tends to be decentralized where individual participant's strategies are also interactive. It is very important for system administrators and individual participants to correctly estimate potential investors' strategic actions. This paper analyzes transmission investors' pure strategy Nash equilibrium based on non cooperative game theory. Each participant's payoff under different strategy profile is given by market simulation. Numerical result shows that participant always maximize his own utility when given other potentials' information, and this is also the so called individual rational principle.

关 键 词：输电网 投资规划 Nash均衡分析 纯策略Nash均衡 电力系统 博奕论 纳什均衡 

分 类 号：TM715[电气工程—电力系统及自动化] O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]