保险中介市场的委托代理问题  

Research on the Principal-Agent Problem About the Insurance Agency Market

作　　者：张慎峰[1] 刘喜华[1] 吴育华[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理学院,天津300072

出　　处：《天津大学学报（社会科学版）》2002年第3期205-209,共5页Journal of Tianjin University：Social Sciences

摘　　要：利用委托—代理理论对保险中介市场的委托代理关系进行了研究。分析了保险中介市场所存在的三种典型的委托人—代理人问题 ,即败德行为、不利选择和寻租行为 ,并就保险中介人激励机制的建立进行了探讨 ,提出了非对称信息条件下 ,制定保险中介最优激励合同的对策性建议。Based on the principal agent theory, this paper studies the principal agent relationship on the insurance agency market. And then, three typical principal agent problems of the insurance agency market are analyzed, that is, moral hazard, adverse selection and profit seeking. In addition,it also discusses the establishment of incentive mechanism and considering the existence of asymmetric information in the insurance agency market, gives some advice about drawing up an optimal incentive contract simultaneously.

关 键 词：委托--代理 保险中介 败德行为 不利选择 寻租 

分 类 号：F840.4[经济管理—保险]