政府与第三方在产品质量监管中的演化博弈分析及仿真研究  

The Analysis of Evolution Game Model and Simulation between Governments and the Third-Party in ProductQuality Regulation

作　　者：于涛[1] 刘长玉[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东师范大学商学院,山东济南250014

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2016年第6期90-96,共7页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点资助项目(13AGL012);山东省社科规划重大委托项目(14AWTJ01-11)

摘　　要：政府与第三方是产品质量监管的两个重要主体,在信息不对称及有限理性条件下,构建了政府与第三方的演化博弈模型,研究了二者在产品质量监管过程中的策略选择问题,并用Matlab仿真演示了不同参数变化时模型的演化均衡策略。结果表明政府监管成本、惩罚额度、第三方检测成本是影响政府与第三方演化博弈系统的关键因素。通过降低政府监管成本,加大对违规第三方的惩罚额度,增加对第三方的补贴力度,有助于提高第三方产品质量监管的积极性。最后,从引入第三方竞争机制、建立第三方管理信息系统及完善第三方奖惩机制方面,提出政府保障第三方履行职责的措施。The product quality has always been a hot academic issue.However there is a wide gap between the situation of product quality and the consumers' growing demand.Quality accidents not only show that the enterprises do not have strong sense of quality,but also reveal the poor efficiency in product regulation.Governments and the third-parties are two important bodies of the product quality regulation,however previous research just proposed the importance of the third-parties,the relationships and behaviors were less considered between them using the quantitative method.Under limited reason conditions,the model of governments and the third-party is constructed based on the evolutionary game.Game analysis shows that the governments' incentives and regulation cost as well as the penalty of the third-party is the critical factor which affects the evolutionary stable strategies.The effect of those critical factors is also discussed by numerical simulation with the variations of the different parameters.The results show that it is helpful to regulate the third-parties by lowering the regulatory costs of governments,increasing subsidies for the third-parties and the punishment of the third-parties' s illegal behavior.Finally valuable and practical suggestions are provided for governments to guide the behavior of the third-parties towards the excepted evolution direction.

关 键 词：政府监管 第三方 产品质量监管 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F203[经济管理—国民经济] F224.32