道德风险与逆向选择:构成存款保险制度缺陷的诱因  

Moral Risk and Adverse Choice:Factors Composing the Deposit Insurance System Defect

作　　者：杨充[1] 郑胜[1] 何燕[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学,成都610074

出　　处：《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》2002年第9期34-36,共3页Modern Finance and Economics：Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：三大“金融安全网”之一的存款保险自创立以来 ,一直受信息不对称问题的困扰 ,道德风险与逆向选择使得该制度的作用在各国受到了广泛置疑。为此 ,本文结合信息经济学和保险学的相关知识分析了道德风险与逆向选择是如何构成存款保险的制度性缺陷的。As one of the 'Three Big Safety Net', the deposit insurance has been disturbed by the information asymmetry ever since its foundation. The moral risk and adverse option make the function of this system doubted in many countries in the world. Combined with some corresponding knowledge of information economics and insurance this article analyzes the reason of how the moral risk and adverse option constitute the systematic defect in the deposit insurance.

关 键 词：道德风险 逆向选择 存款保险制度 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F840.682[经济管理—保险]