论构建中国保险信用评级制度的微观基础  

Comments on Microbase of Chinese Insurance Credit Rating Institution

作　　者：刘友芝[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学新华金融保险学院,湖北武汉430064

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2002年第5期41-44,共4页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：当前 ,我国保险市场出现了较严重的市场失灵 ,一方面某些保险人及其行为代理人违背诚信原则 ,引起了公众的信任危机 ,抑制了保险市场的进一步拓展 ;另一方面保险人之间的无序竞争、恶性竞争态势牺牲了保险市场的经营效率。这在很大程度上是由于我国保险市场交易主体之间的严重的信息不对称分布格局所致。本文从信息不对称角度出发 ,提供了一个矫正我国保险市场信息不对称状态的制度安排保险信用评级制度的微观理论框架。At present,there appears serious market failure in Chinese insurance market.On one hand,some insurers and their agents violate the principle of utmost good faith which result in public confidence crisis and restrain the further exploitation of the insurance market;on the other hand,the disordered vicious competence between the insurance parties harms the operation efficiency in the market.It's to a large extent due to the severe information asymmetry existed between the trade parties in the market.From the perspective of information asymmetry theory, the author offers an institution arrangement rectifying the information asymmetry in our insurance market-the micro-theory framework of insurance credit rating institution.

关 键 词：中国 保险信用评级制度 保险市场 信息不对称 交易成本 市场失灵 

分 类 号：F842[经济管理—保险]