村级发展互助资金组织成员参与不足:特征、成因及破解之道  

The Members' Participation of the Mutual Aid Fund for Village Development Organization: Features, Causes and Solutions

作　　者：刘西川[1] 陈立辉[2] 李俊浩[3] 

机构地区：[1]浙江理工大学经济管理学院 [2]浙江大学中国农村发展研究院 [3]浙江理工大学马克思主义学院

出　　处：《财经智库》2017年第3期67-86,共20页Financial Minds

摘　　要：基于贵州等5省160个样本村调查数据,本文从股权参与、管理参与和业务参与三个维度实证考察互助资金组织的成员参与及其特征,揭示成员参与不足的成因并探寻破解之道。研究发现:(1)样本地区农户不愿入股,普通成员与贫困成员参与管理少,非贫困群体得到贷款多。(2)农户不愿入股或入股少是因为现有制度政策设计未能有效保护投资者利益;非精英群体参与管理少是政府干预与社区分化综合作用的结果;贫困群体参与贷款少既有制度层面的原因,也有贫困者自身方面的原因。本文认为,保护投资者利益、完善科学决策和激励相容机制是破解互助资金组织成员参与困境的可行之道。在此基础上,本文就重构股权参与、管理参与及贷款参与提出了具体建议。Based on the data from 160 sample villages in Guizhou,Sichuan,Shandong,Anhui and Henan,this paper empirically analyses the features and the causes of the members' participation of the Mutual Aid Fundfor Village Development in which the holding shares,the management participation and the services using are emphasized,while the solutions are discussed at last. It is found that farmers have no willingness to be a shareholder,the usual farmers and the poor have not participated into the management and the non-poor have got more loans in the sample areas. The reason for farmers holding no share or a few lies in the existing institutions failing to protect the investors' interests effectively. The government intervention and the community differentiation prevent non-elites from managing the organization. The cause of the poorer holding less loans lies not only in the imperfect governance institutions,but also the limitation of themselves. This paper argues that to protect the interests of investors and to improve the scientific decision-making mechanism and incentive-compatible mechanism are viable solutions to the plight of members' participation. Taking all of above into account,we make suggestions on the reconstruction of the shareholding,the management and the services.

关 键 词：村级发展互助资金组织 互助资金 农村金融 金融脱贫 

分 类 号：F832.35[经济管理—金融学]