权力游戏与中国石油产业定价机制的变迁  

Power Game and the Evolution of Oil Pricing Mechanism in China

作　　者：梁波[1] 王海英[1] LIANG Bo;WANG Hai-ying(Nanchang University,Nanchang,Jiangxi330031,China)

机构地区：[1]南昌大学公共管理学院,江西南昌330031

出　　处：《中国流通经济》2017年第9期53-62,共10页China Business and Market

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目"产业治理中的社会微观秩序研究"(11CSH036)

摘　　要：20世纪90年代中后期以来,中国石油产业的定价机制经历了从传统计划定价向与国际接轨的市场化定价的重要转变。作为一种产业的组织与制度现象,这种变迁不能简单理解为国家强制性制度变迁的结果,其背后隐含着国家、国有石油企业、石油消费群体等行动者之间围绕定价机制变革而构建起来的特定权力游戏。正是这种权力游戏过程构成了中国石油产业定价机制变迁的深层组织逻辑。作为定价机制变革游戏的主要参与者,国家、国有石油企业、石油消费群体等行动者间具有差别性甚至冲突性的利益目标,都拥有各自可能动用的行动能力与关键资源,在权衡特定游戏环境的基础上,采取策略性的行动,最终达成某种最低限度的合作,成功推动了正式制度层面石油定价机制的渐进变革。Since the late1990s,the pricing mechanism of Chinese oil industry underwent a great shift from traditional pricing mode by central government to the new mechanism of being in line with international oil market and partially marketised.As one kind of organizational and institutional phenomenon,this transformation could not be recognized as the outcome of the coercive institutional change controlled by central government.Actually,in this institutional change hidden behind a so called power game between the nation,national oil company and consumers on the issue of pricing mechanism change.And it is just this kind of power game which could be found as the deeply-seated organizational logic of the pricing mechanism change of Chinese oil industry.Concretely,the nation,national oil enterprises and oil consumers as the main actors have their own benefits or goals which are always different or contradict,and action capacity or critical resources.On the basis of understanding the special game environments,they could take different strategies and then finally achieved some minimal agreement and pushed the change of formal pricing mechanism of Chinese oil industry.

关 键 词：中国石油产业 定价机制 权力游戏 

分 类 号：F123.9[经济管理—世界经济]