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作 者:林翔 瞿勇[2] Lin Xiang;Qu Yong(System Lab, Research Institute of Integrated Demonstration, Naval Academy of Armament, Beijing 100161, China;College of Science, Naval University of Engineering, Wuhan 430033, China)
机构地区:[1]海军装备研究院综合论证研究所体系室,北京100161 [2]海军工程大学理学院,武汉430033
出 处:《兵工自动化》2017年第8期33-36,43,共5页Ordnance Industry Automation
摘 要:为协调不确定交货条件下装备维修器材供应链各成员的利益关系,运用Stackelberg主从博弈理论进行对策研究。以维修单位作为主方,提出最佳订货量和单位缺货惩罚成本策略,从方即供应商以额外供应能力作为响应;以维修单位预期成本最小化为目标建立优化模型,结合约束条件构建带有惩罚因子的特殊适应度函数;利用粒子群优化算法进行仿真计算。仿真结果表明:Stackelberg主从博弈可以有效协调装备维修器材供应链,保证供应链及各成员的利益。Based on Stackelberg game theory,a countermeasures study was presented to coordinate the interests of the supply chain members of equipment maintenance material under the condition of uncertain delivery capacity,in which the maintenance unit was the leader giving the optimal order quantity and the per unit penalty cost in short supply,and the supplier was the follower responding with the best additional supply capacity.Constructed the optimization model to minimize the expected cost of the maintenance unit,and the special fitness function with a penalty factor based on constraint conditions was established.Used the particle swarm optimization algorithm(PSO)to carry out simulation and calculation.The results show that the Stackelberg game can effectively coordinate the supply chain of equipment maintenance material,and to ensure the interests of the supply chain and its members.
关 键 词:装备维修器材 Stackelberg主从博弈 供应链 粒子群优化算法
分 类 号:TJ07[兵器科学与技术—兵器发射理论与技术]
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