官员任期限制下刺激投资的政策选择  

Choice of Investment Stimulation Policy Under the Limited Term of Officials

作　　者：侯麟科[1] 吕玉霞 耿浩 HOU Lin-ke;LV Yu-xia;GENG Hao(Center for Economic Research, Shandong University, Jinan 250100, China;School of Economics and Trade, Shandong Management University, Jinan 250357, China)

机构地区：[1]山东大学经济研究院,济南250100 [2]山东管理学院经贸学院,济南250357

出　　处：《天津商业大学学报》2017年第5期9-13,28,共6页Journal of Tianjin University of Commerce

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71273012);山东省自然科学基金项目(ZR2016GM24)

摘　　要：地方官员可以通过影响实际税率和进行投资补贴来刺激投资,发展本地经济。官员任期制度对官员在促进地方投资的动机和政策选择上存在重要影响。在任期限制下,官员会出现一定程度的短视行为,即现时偏向性偏好。我们在Pennnings所做的研究基础上,通过模型来探讨在存在现时偏向型偏好的政府投资刺激政策选择问题。模型显示,政府的投资刺激政策选择受到不同因素的影响。在政府的现时偏向性很强的情况下,政府会偏向通过减税来刺激投资。有研究显示,地方官员的任期呈现缩短的趋向,官员的短视行为更为明显。在这一背景下,政府政策的制定应该考虑任期对官员激励的影响。Local officials could stimulate investment through tax reduction or subsidies and in turn accelerate the development of local economy.The limited term of local officials has an important influence on their incentives to boost local investment and policy choices.Under the term limitation,the myopia of officials with present-biased time preferences emerges.Inspired by the research of Pennings,the article explores the government’s choice of stimulation policies in thepresence of present-biased time preference.The model shows that the government’s investment stimulation policy is affected by multiple factors.Under the strong present-biased time preference of government,tax reduction is preferred.The decreasing term of local officials leads to a stronger myopic behavior of local officials.For incentive compatible mechanism,the central government should consider the influence of the officials’term limitation on the motivation of local officials.

关 键 词：官员任期 实际税率 投资补贴 短视行为 现时偏向性偏好 

分 类 号：F812.4[经济管理—财政学]