商业银行影子银行业务的监管套利分析  

Analysis of Regulatory Arbitrage of Shadow Banking in Commercial Banks

作　　者：林德发[1] 胡晓 LIN De-fa;HU Xiao(School of Economics, Tianjin University of Commerce, Tianjin 300134, China)

机构地区：[1]天津商业大学经济学院,天津300134

出　　处：《天津商业大学学报》2017年第5期14-18,共5页Journal of Tianjin University of Commerce

基　　金：天津市哲学社会科学规划项目"银行过度风险承担视角下我国逆周期监管机制优化研究"(TJYYWT16-019)

摘　　要：在追逐利润、规避监管和金融创新的驱动下,我国商业银行的影子银行业务得到迅速发展。从金融发展的过程来看,部分金融创新是从规避金融监管的角度出发,目标指向监管套利,商业银行影子银行业务同样如此,其监管套利的特征表现得十分明显。重点分析了商业银行影子银行业务监管套利的行为、原因及影响,并在此基础上提出了商业银行影子银行业务监管套利的风险防范对策。Driven by the pursuit of profits,avoiding regulation and financial innovation,China’s shadow banking in commercial banks has been developing rapidly.From the perspective of financial development,some financial innovations aim to circumvent financial supervision and get regulatory arbitrage,and the same is true for shadow banking business in commercial banks because the regulatory arbitrage performance is very obvious.This article focuses on the behaviors,causes and effects of regulatory arbitrage of shadow banking business in commercial banks,and puts forward some risk prevention measures for regulatory arbitrage of shadow banking business in commercial banks.

关 键 词：商业银行 影子银行业务 监管套利 

分 类 号：F832.1[经济管理—金融学]