关于模态形而上学的几点思考  

A Few Thoughts on Modal Metaphysics

作　　者：余俊伟[1] Junwei Yu(School of Philosophy, Renmin University of China)

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学哲学院

出　　处：《逻辑学研究》2017年第3期58-74,共17页Studies in Logic

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"经典逻辑与非经典逻辑的哲学基础研究"(13BZX064);国家社会科学基金重大项目"认知科学对当代哲学的挑战"(11&ZD187)

摘　　要：模态逻辑的"原罪"除了奎因指出的混淆了使用与提及外,还包括误以为在命题层面可以揭示概念间的必然联系。必然涉及内涵特性,单纯地从外延角度、在命题层面考察必然,有无法克服的缺陷。克里普克通过语言分析解决必然的内涵特性所带来的问题掩盖了问题的实质,无法触及必然的普遍规律性之本质。这是可能世界语义学的"原罪"。尽管有后天必然真,但克里普克的晨星之例并不属于此类。而他的米尺之例也难以称得上是先天偶然真。这些都是"原罪"的反映。The“sin”of modal logic includes trying to display the necessary relation betweenconcepts on the level of proposition as well as the confusing use and mention which waspointed by Quine.Necessity concerns intension.We will encounter unsurmountableproblems when characterizing necessity extensionally simply on the level of proposition.Kripke is beside the point and just covers up the essence of necessity when he triedto solve the problems stemming from the intension of necessity simply by analyzing language.This is the“sin”of possible-worlds semantics.Kripke’s example on the MorningStar is not a necessary a posteriori truth although there are such truths.Kripke’s exampleon the standard meter is not a perfect example of a priori contingent truths.All theseembody the“sin”.

关 键 词：模态逻辑 先天偶然与后天必然 可能世界语义学 

分 类 号：B815.1[哲学宗教—逻辑学]