社会组织参与区域合作治理进化博弈模型  

Evolutionary game model of regional cooperative governance with social organizations’ participation

作　　者：王兴广[1] 韩传峰[1] 田萃[1] 徐松鹤[1] WANG Xing-guang;HAN Chuan-feng;TIAN Cui;XU Song-he(School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China)

机构地区：[1]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海200092

出　　处：《中国人口·资源与环境》2017年第8期28-35,共8页China Population,Resources and Environment

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重大研究计划重点支持项目"非常规突发事件处置模式及应急技术集成原理与方法(批准号:91024023);"中国应急管理体系顶层设计原理方法及模式重构"(批准号:91224003);国家自然科学基金青年项目"中国区域环境整体政府治理模式及政策路径研究"(批准号:71403186)

摘　　要：社会多元化与公民社会的快速发展,促使社会组织参与社会治理和应急响应的诉求与能力日益加强,驱动着政府职能变革和区域治理方式创新。区域合作治理过程中,治理主体依据情景态势调整策略,影响其他主体的治理收益和策略选择,形成复杂的动态博弈关系。本文把握政府与社会组织的动态博弈行为特征,确定区域合作治理的博弈支付矩阵与复制动态方程,构建区域政府与社会组织合作治理进化博弈模型。分析得出5个可能的均衡点,通过雅可比矩阵分析均衡点的稳定性,可知政府与社会组织合作治理进化博弈的长期稳定策略集为{(合作,合作),(不合作,不合作)}。模型结果分析表明,合作收益直接影响着博弈稳定策略的进化方向,收益大于成本是政府与社会组织选择合作策略的必要条件,任一方的合作收益小于成本,选择独立行动是双方的占优策略,最终的策略选择与政府和社会组织合作所获取的超额收益、支付成本及合作水平密切相关。合作超额收益增加或合作水平提升时,博弈系统向(合作,合作)演化的概率加大;合作成本增加时,博弈系统向(不合作,不合作)演化的概率加大。制度规范不健全、组织信任缺失、社会组织力量薄弱等因素影响进化均衡结果,社会组织创新发展氛围尚未形成、自组织性和自律性内生动力不足,是制约社会组织参与合作治理的关键问题。基于此,提出社会组织参与区域合作治理的协调机制及培育机制,具体策略包括:明确权责关系、畅通参与渠道、创新合作形式,以及优化管理制度、让渡成长空间和树立社会公信。With the diversification of society and the great development of the civil society,ability and demand of social organizations to participate in social governance and emergency response are gradually strengthened,which greatly drives the transformation of government function and the innovation of regional governance mode.In the process of regional cooperative governance,the main governance body adjusts strategy based on the current situation and variation tendency.Then,the governance income and strategy choice of other body are influenced.The dynamic game relationship between the government and the social organizations is formed after this process.Based on the analysis of dynamic game behavior,the game payoff matrix and replicated dynamic equation about the government and social organizations in regional social complex system were established.The evolutionary game model between the government and social organizations was constructed.Analysis of the stability of the five possible equilibrium points by the Jacobian matrix revealed that the longterm stability strategy of the cooperative game between the government and the social organizations in the evolutionary game was{(cooperation,cooperation),(noncooperation,noncooperation)}.According to analysis of model results,cooperation income directly affected the evolution direction of game equilibrium,and it was necessary condition for government and social organizations to choose cooperation strategy that the benefits outweighed the costs;independent action was the dominant strategy when cooperation benefit of either party was less than the cost;the choice of strategy was closely related to the excess income,the cost of payment and the level of cooperation.The probability of game system evolving to(cooperation,cooperation)increased when the excessive returns increased or the cooperation level rose;the probability of the game system evolving to(noncooperation,noncooperation)increased when the cooperation cost increased.Influence factors of evolutionary equilibrium incl

关 键 词：区域治理 合作治理 社会组织 进化博弈 

分 类 号：C916[经济管理]