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作 者:姜仁良[1] 梁程程 JIANG Ren-liang;LIANG Cheng-cheng(School of Public Administration,Tianjin University of Commerce,Tianjin 300134,China)
出 处:《天津商业大学学报》2018年第2期15-21,共7页Journal of Tianjin University of Commerce
基 金:国家自然科学基金项目"项目控制权与风险分担动态耦合对工程合同状态补偿影响研究"(71471132)
摘 要:从博弈论视角出发,在建立马路劳务市场各利益相关者博弈模型的基础上,分析不同局中人在不同博弈中的策略选择及期望支付,说明在当前条件下马路劳务市场已陷入博弈困境和治理僵局。由此考虑引入新的局中人打破博弈困境,借鉴BOT模式引导新马路劳务市场博弈寻求均衡解,从而得到引导马路劳务市场各利益相关者走向合作共赢的一体化治理方案。From the perspective of game theory,the article builds a game model of the parties concerned in road labor market and analyzes the strategy choice and expected payment of different people in different games,which shows that road labor market is in a game dilemma and regulation stalemate under the present conditions.It considers the introduction of new players in the game to break through the predicament and leams from the BOT mode to reach a game equilibrium in road labor market to lead the parties concerned to cooperation and mutual benefits.
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