公共投资政策、生产方竞争与农户福利:以转基因作物为例  

Public investment policy,producer competition and farmers' welfare: case study of genetically modified crops

作　　者：吕玉霞 LV Yu-xia(School of Economics and Trade,Shandong Management University,Jinan 250357,China)

机构地区：[1]山东管理学院经贸学院,济南250357

出　　处：《天津商业大学学报》2018年第2期22-26,共5页Journal of Tianjin University of Commerce

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71273012);山东省自然科学基金面上项目(ZR2016GM24)

摘　　要：转基因作物商业化带来巨大经济利益,但是少数跨国公司可能向小农户征收垄断价格以攫取大部分社会福利。通过建立两阶段动态博弈模型,分析公共投资对转基因种子研发及转基因市场结构的影响。研究发现,如果缺乏公共投资分享政策,种子行业外资厂商通过过度投资可能形成独家垄断市场,其结果会造成农户福利下降。转基因技术公共投资分享提高了国内厂商购买转基因技术的积极性,有助于国内研发转基因新技术的推广和防止国外企业在市场上垄断定价,可以在一定程度上保护小农户利益。The commercialization of genetically modified crops has brought about huge economic benefits.However,a few multinational corporations may carry out monopoly price of seeds for small farmers to seize much of social welfare.With a two-stage dynamic game model,the article analyzes the impacts of public investment on genetically modified seed development and market structure.The results indicate that if there lacks the public investment sharing policy,foreign manufacturers in seed industry may overinvest to form the exclusive monopoly market,which will result in the reduction of farmers’welfare.The public investment sharing of genetically modified technology has improved the domestic manufactures'positivity to purchase genetically modified technology,which will contribute to the spread of new domestic genetically modified technology and the prevention of monopoly price of foreign corporations in the market to protect small farmers'benefits to some extent.

关 键 词：公共投资 农户福利 农业转基因技术 动态博弈 

分 类 号：F323.3[经济管理—产业经济]