证券分析师的利益冲突问题研究——基于进化博弈模型  

Research on the conflicts of interest of securities analysts——Based on the evolutionary game model

作　　者：陈驰 张青龙[1] CHEN Chi;ZAHNG Qing-long(College of Management,University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai 200093,China)

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093

出　　处：《中国林业经济》2018年第2期101-105,共5页China Forestry Economics

摘　　要：研究当证券分析师的预测结果与该分析师服务机构的利益相悖时,该分析师与投资者的策略选择与利益关系,通过进化博弈模型研究了证券分析师与中小投资者双方群体博弈的行为规律,提出其进化稳定状态及各影响因素的作用,并根据这一结果来有针对性地提出策略与建议。The article studies the strategic choice and the interest relationship between the analyst and the investor when the forecast result of the securities analyst is contrary to the interest of the analyst service agency and studies the relationship between the analyst and the investor.And through the evolutionary game model,this paper studies the behavior of the group game between securities analysts and small and medium-sized investors.And then derives its evolutionary and stable status and the impact of various influencing factors.Finally,based on this result,it puts forward some strategies and suggestions.

关 键 词：分析师预测 投资者行为 进化博弈 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学]