基于博弈期权的BOT项目融资创新研究  

Innovative Research on BOT Project Financing Based on Game Option

作　　者：王献东 WANG Xiandong(School of Sciences and Chemical Engineering,Changzhou Institute of Technology,Changzhou 213032)

机构地区：[1]常州工学院数理与化工学院,江苏常州213032

出　　处：《常州工学院学报》2018年第1期58-64,共7页Journal of Changzhou Institute of Technology

摘　　要：针对现有的BOT项目提前终止补偿条款存在可操作性差的缺陷,引入博弈期权可有效地解决这一问题。首先,基于离散时间的二叉树模型对每段时间内BOT项目的收益进行建模,并给出计算项目公司持有项目价值的递推公式;然后,利用二叉树方法对BOT项目融资中的博弈期权进行定价;最后,通过一个算例分析验证了方法的可行性,结果表明:构建的模型具有较好的可靠性,可以为政府和项目公司提供决策参考。Owing to the defect of poor operability in early-termination compensation clause of theexistingBOT project,the paper solves this problem effectively by introducing game option.Firstly,the binary tree model based on discrete time is constructed for modeling project profits of each period,and the value of project held by the project company is calculated by recurrence formula.Then,the price of the game option is presented by the method of binary tree.Finally,a numerical example is provided to verify the feasibility of the method.The result shows that the model has a good reliability,which provides reference for the decision-making of government and the project company.

关 键 词：BOT项目融资 博弈期权 二叉树 提前终止 

分 类 号：F224.9[经济管理—国民经济]