保险公司董事会治理、公司绩效与偿付能力  被引量:2

Board Governance, Corporate Performance and Solvency of Insurance Companies

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作  者:郝臣 钱璟[2] Hao Chen;Qian Jing(China Academy of Corporate Governance,Nankai University,Tianjin 300071;Business School,Nankai University,Tianjin 300071)

机构地区:[1]南开大学中国公司治理研究院,天津300071 [2]南开大学商学院,天津300071

出  处:《金融发展研究》2018年第3期12-20,共9页Journal Of Financial Development Research

基  金:国家社科基金年度项目"保险公司治理;投资效率与投保人利益保护研究"(16BGL055);中国保监会部级研究课题"我国保险公司偿付能力影响因素研究"(CIRCRP2017-017)

摘  要:随着金融业的深入发展,金融机构的公司治理问题受到越来越多的关注。本文利用127家保险公司的公开数据,以因子分析法构建的公司绩效为中介变量,探究董事会治理对偿付能力的作用以及公司绩效的中介效应。研究发现,董事金融背景比例、董事精算背景比例和董事硕博学历比例直接对偿付能力产生影响,董事金融和精算背景比例对偿付能力有正向作用,而董事硕博学历比例对偿付能力有负向作用;董事会独立性通过公司绩效间接对偿付能力产生影响,董事会独立性对偿付能力有负向作用。With the development of financial industry,the corporate governance of financial institutions is more and more concerned.In this paper,we use public information of 127 insurance companies.We make corporate performance as a mediator variable based on factor analysis method and explore the influence of board governance on solvency and the mediating effect of corporate performance of insurance companies.The results show that the proportions of directors of finance,actuary and educational backgrounds have direct effects on solvency,and there is a positive correlation between the proportions of directors of finance,actuary backgrounds and the solvency,while there is a negative correlation between the proportion of directors of educational background and the solvency.The proportion of independent directors indirectly plays a role in the solvency through the intermediary of corporate performance,and there is a negative correlation between the proportion of independent directors and the solvency.Finally,this paper puts forward some suggestions to improve the board governance of insurance companies.

关 键 词:保险公司 偿付能力 董事会治理 公司绩效 

分 类 号:F840.3[经济管理—保险]

 

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