乡土官员对区域经济与环境发展路径的影响  

Influences of native local officials on regional economic and environmental development paths

作　　者：雷平[1,2] 曹黎明 赵连荣[1,2] LEI Ping;CAO Li-ming;ZHAO Lian-rong(School of Humanities and Economics,China University of Geosciences(Beijing),Beijing 100083,China;Key Laboratory of Resources and Environmental Carrying Capacity of Ministry of Land and Resources,Beijing 100083,China)

机构地区：[1]中国地质大学(北京)人文经管学院,北京100083 [2]国土资源部资源环境承载力评价重点实验室,北京100083

出　　处：《中国人口·资源与环境》2018年第4期163-176,共14页China Population,Resources and Environment

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"产业空间布局的资源环境效应:基于地方政府规制的研究"(批准号:41471112);中央高校基本业务费优秀教师研究项目(批准号:292015155)

摘　　要：家乡人为官对本地的资源环境影响是什么?相比"政治集权,经济分权"等正式规制,这一重要的、具有浓厚中国特色的官员个人特征的环境效应问题被忽视。本文从非正式规制视角,基于乡土官员对区域高能耗产业影响的实证研究,讨论了乡土官员对区域经济与环境发展路径的影响。与传统直觉不同,乡土化官员并没有"为官一任,造绿家乡"。基于官员替代这一准自然实验,发现官员替换对区域经济有短期促进影响,原因是其能短期刺激第二产业,但长期效应为负;研究还发现,相对官员替换无来源变化、以及官员替换外地化,官员替换乡土化会显著提升区域高能耗产业比重,但存在1~2年的滞后期。2007年前后,我国环境规制出现重大改变,之前更注重经济增长,之后则显著增加了环境规制在本地官员考核中的比重。基于这一正式规制演变,本文实证检验了乡土官员对区域高能耗产业发展影响的稳定性。研究证实,正式环境规制的演进显著降低了来源无差异和外地化更替后的官员对高能耗产业发展的偏好,表现为回归系数前者由显著正相关转为不显著,后者由统计上不显著转为显著负相关。本文重点关注的乡土化官员的高能耗产业比重回归系数在政策转变前后都是统计上显著为正,且数值在后期有较大幅度增加,呈现出超脱于正式规制变化的稳定特征。为探索乡土化官员区域环境行为与直觉相悖的原因,本文引入市场化指数指标以研究其在不同市场化水平区域的表现,结果发现在市场化指数越高的地区,乡土化官员的高能耗产业促进效应越强。这一结果显示对乡土官员行为的直觉认知与实证研究的冲突可能是人口流动性上升的结果,或者是旧的"熟人社会"瓦解与新的法制、信用社会治理规范尚未完全建立的冲突的结果。What is the impact of native local officials on the local resources and environment?Compared with the formal regulations as of‘political centralization and economic decentralization’,the issue of environmental effects,which is of great importance and has strong Chinese characteristic of official individualism,has been neglected.From the perspective of informal regulation,based on the practical study of the influence of local officials on the regional high-energy consumption industries,this paper discusses the influence of local officials on regional economic and environmental development.Unlike traditional intuitions,local officials do not fulfill the promise of‘take the office once,and make a green hometown’.Based on the quasi-natural experiment of official replacement,this paper finds that,consistent with the previous studies,the replacement of officials has short-term promotion effect on the regional economy because it can stimulate the secondary industry temporarily,but the long-term effect is negative.In this paper we find that compared to fixed-sourced and foreign-sourced replacement of officials and relative officials,localized official replacement will significantly enhance the proportion of high energy consuming industries,but there is 1-2 years of lagging.The Chinese government made major changes to its environmental regulations in 2007.Economic growth was our orientation beforehand;after that,the share of environmental regulations among local officials witnessed significant increase.Based on the evolution of this formal regulation,this paper validates the stability of the influence of local officials on the development of high energy consumption industries.And we confirm that the evolution of formal environmental regulation has significantly changed the preference of officials from fixed source or foreign source on high energy consuming industries,with the correlation of the former drops from positive to not significant,and the later come from not significant to negative.Localized officials’r

关 键 词：官员来源 乡土官员 非正式 规制 高耗能产业 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]