高等学校教师多任务激励的最优契约安排  

The Optimal Contract Arrangement of Multi-Task Incentive for Teachers in Universities

作　　者：麻艳如[1] MA Yanru(Capital University of Economics and Business,Beijing 100070,China)

机构地区：[1]首都经济贸易大学劳动经济学院,北京100070

出　　处：《首都经济贸易大学学报》2018年第3期70-77,共8页Journal of Capital University of Economics and Business

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目"我国高校教师教学评价制度的效果及重构研究"(17YJC880055)

摘　　要：高等学校是具有多重目标的复杂组织,教师作为劳动者拥有追求个人效用的动机,高校需要通过全体教师实现其多重目标,每个教师则需要承担多个任务,而每个任务目标又是多维的,因此,内部劳动力市场视角下,高校和教师之间呈现多代理人、多任务和多维的复杂委托-代理关系。在"岗位聘任制"的宏观制度框架下,通过建立以教书育人、科学研究和社会服务为任务的委托-代理模型,得出不同情境和不同任务下的最优契约安排,提出高校教师激励机制设计的契约安排及优化建议。The universities are complex organizations with multiple objectives.Each teacher needs to undertake multiple tasks,and each task goal is multi-dimensional.Therefore,there are many principal-agent,multi task and multidimensional principal-agent relationships between universities and teachers.In the the position appointment system,the different situations and tasks under the optimal contract arrangement is analyzed through the establishment of teaching,scientific research and social services for the task principal-agent model,suggestions are put forward to optimize the design of incentive mechanism of university teachers.

关 键 词：高等学校 多任务激励 最优契约 

分 类 号：G647[文化科学—高等教育学]