WMNs中基于重复博弈的机会路由激励机制研究  

Research on opportunitstic routing incentive mechanism based on repeated game in WMNs

作　　者：吴军 莫伟伟 印新棋 白光伟 WU Jun;MO Weiwei;YIN Xinqi;BAI Guangwei(School of Computer Science and Technology,Nanjing Technology University,Nanjing 211816,China)

机构地区：[1]南京工业大学计算机科学与技术学院,南京211816

出　　处：《计算机工程与应用》2018年第10期110-114,共5页Computer Engineering and Applications

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(No.60673185;No.61073197)

摘　　要：无线Mesh网中虽然有固定节点,但是其中大量的移动节点仍然有能源、带宽、内存等限制。在机会路由协议中,数据包从源节点至目的节点,需要中继节点机会性地转发;但由于节点自身条件的原因,节点行为往往趋向于自私,不愿接受转发请求。节点不合作行为中的自私性是导致网络吞吐量随之下降的主要原因之一。针对该问题,提出邻居节点合作度评估函数的概念,并建立基于合作度评估函数的宽容针锋相对策略节点重复博弈模型(CGTFT)。仿真表明,该模型可以有效抑制自私,激励节点合作,提高网络吞吐量。Wireless mesh networks have fixed nodes,but a large number of mobile nodes still have energy,bandwidth,memory,and other restrictions.In opportunistic routing protocols,data packets from source nodes to destination nodes,need to be forwarded by relay nodes opportunistically.However,due to node restrictions itself,nodes are often reluctant to accept the forward request.Selfishness in non-cooperation among nodes is the main reason for the decrease of network throughput.To solve this problem,the concept of cooperation degree evaluation function is proposed.And a repeated game model of CGTFT strategy nodes based on evaluation function of cooperation is established.The simulation result shows that the model can effectively suppress selfishness and incentive cooperation and improve networks throughput.

关 键 词：无线Mesh网(WMNs) 机会路由 重复博弈 合作度评估函数 激励机制 

分 类 号：TP393[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]