股权和控制权配置:从对等到非对等的逻辑——基于央属混合所有制上市公司的实证研究  

The Allocation Logic of Equity Ownership and Control Rights from Equivalence to Non-equivalence: An Empirical Test of Listed Companies with Mixed-ownership under the Supervision of SASAC

作　　者：刘汉民[1] 齐宇 解晓晴[1] LIU Hanmin;QI Yu;XIE Xiaoqing(Management School,Jinan University)

机构地区：[1]暨南大学管理学院,邮政编码510632

出　　处：《经济研究》2018年第5期175-189,共15页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目"新组织理论和组织治理研究"(批准号11&ZD153);国家社会科学基金一般项目"复杂组织目标和效能评估研究"(批准号13BGL004)的资助

摘　　要：针对混合所有制企业改革中企业控制权安排的难题,利用我国央属具有混合所有制性质的上市公司数据,在控制行业分类的前提下,通过研究股权结构和董事会结构与企业绩效的关系,论证了股权和控制权非对等配置的逻辑合理性。研究发现,降低前五大股东中国有股占比有利于提高企业绩效,但过多提高非国有股占比不会提高企业绩效;提高非国有董事占比有利于提高企业绩效,但过多减少国有董事占比不会提高企业绩效;相比于股权结构,董事会结构对企业绩效的影响更大。在上述研究基础上,进一步探索了国有股占比和非国有股占比的最优区间,并提出了在不改变国有控股地位的前提下,解决混合所有制改革困局的设想和建议。The reform of China s mixed ownership enterprises is on the horns of a dilemma:on the one hand,the state-owned shareholders still occupy the dominant position of control rights,which weakens the ability of heterogeneous shareholders to participate in corporate business;on the other hand,the one-share-one-vote rule results in corporate control subject to ownership and thus,the reform of mixed ownership enterprises is difficult to go deeply.Under this circumstance,how to arrange corporate control rights in order to make mixed ownership reform deepen and improve corporate performance?There are two approaches about arrangements of control rights:one is the logic of equivalence,which argues that the arrangement of control rights should be consistent with equity structure,abiding by the role of one-share-one-vote.The other is the logic of non-equivalence,which argues that the arrangement of control rights can be separated from equity structure and need not to abide by the rule of one-share-one-vote.Most scholars,e.g.,Grossman&Hart(1986),Hart&Moore(1990),Harris&Raviv(1989),follow the first approach.Some other scholars,e.g.,Choi(2015),based on the practice of non-equivalent allocation between equity and control,rethink the logic of equivalence and put forward the idea of non-equivalent allocation between equity and control.But,for a company with both state-owned shares and non-state-owned shares,how to arrange control rights can it improve corporate performance?In other words,is it essential for mixed ownership enterprises to follow the role of one-share-one-vote?To solve this problem,we should demonstrate with sufficient empirical data that how and in what degree the allocation of equity and control affects corporate performance.By using the data of corporate performance,equity structure and board structure in all listed companies under SASAC,State Council,and by controlling the industry classification,this paper investigates the correlation of equity structure,board structure and firm performance.In order to avoid the

关 键 词：混合所有制 国企改革 公司治理 企业绩效 

分 类 号：G32[文化科学]