省直管县改革背景下市县之间关于放权的博弈分析  

The Delegation of Power between Prefectural Cities and Counties Directly under the Provincial Governments

作　　者：宋翔[1,2] Song Xiang

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院研究生院 [2]中国社会科学院研究生院工业经济系

出　　处：《中国社会科学院研究生院学报》2018年第3期72-79,共8页Journal of Graduate School of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

摘　　要：本文通过对组织经济学关于上下层级之间资源分配理论的简单数学分析,讨论了省直管县改革背景下市县之间关于权力下放的博弈以及市县两级政府的优势策略。本文指出,对市县之间关于权力划分的讨论应置于中国地方政府治理模式的理论框架下进行,并认为中国改革过程的不完全合约特点对层级政府之间的激励机制和运行规则产生了很大的影响。省直管县的体制创新改变了市县之间政绩合约中控制权和索取权的分配,并导致市级政府放权激励不足,但由放权而激发的县域经济发展和竞争对市级区域产生了正向外溢作用,仍能够使市县之间建立起激励相容。The article discusses the delegation of power between prefectural cities and counties directly under the provincial governments,and the strategies of both sides,based on a brief mathematical analysis of the resource allocation between the two grades of authority from the perspective of organizational economy.The topic of delegation of power between prefectural cities and counties should be studied in a theoretical framework of local governance of China,for that the reform in China with characteristics of incomplete contracts heavily affected the incentive mechanism and operating rules between different government levels.The power allocation of control and claim in the performance contracts between the prefectural city and the counties under it has been changed by the institutional innovation of counties directly under the provincial governments.This innovation reduces the prefectural city s motivation to delegate power.But prefectural cities and counties can establish incentive compatibility due to the spillover effect in municipal regions of the economic development and competition between counties stimulated by the delegation of power.

关 键 词：省直管县 市县博弈 权力下放 控制权 

分 类 号：D630[政治法律—政治学]