“城中村”土地开发中的利益博弈和法律调节  

Interest Game and Legal Regulation in Land Development of Urban Village

作　　者：陈清 CHEN Qing

机构地区：[1]江苏师范大学法学院

出　　处：《江苏警官学院学报》2018年第3期36-41,共6页Journal of Jiangsu Police Institute

基　　金：江苏高校哲学社会科学研究一般项目"‘城中村’改造法律问题研究:基础理论与制度实践"(2014SJB397)的阶段性成果

摘　　要："城中村"改造中的利益博弈集中体现于土地开发过程中的利益再分配。由于地方政府拥有公权力、拆迁人经济实力强等因素,使得被拆迁人在利益博弈中处于明显弱势。土地征收补偿的立法理念失衡、法律体系不完整、公私法边界不清,进一步加重了利益失衡。土地征收立法在理念上应以被拆迁人利益为中心,在层级上应以拆迁补偿法为中心,在程序上应以民事纠纷的预防和处理为中心。The interest game in urban village renewal is embodied in the benefit redistribution in the process of land development.Due to the public power of local government and the strong economic strength of the developers,the demolished persons are in a significant disadvantage in the game of interests.The imbalance of the legislative concept,the incomplete legal system and the unclear boundary between public and private law in land development further aggravate the imbalance of interests.demolition compensation legislation should be centered on the interests of the demolished persons,on the level of demolition compensation law,and on the procedure of civil dispute prevention and treatment.

关 键 词：房地产开发 土地征收 拆迁补偿法 

分 类 号：D922.36[政治法律—法学]