微分博弈视角下政府建筑安全监管策略分析  

Analysis of Government Building Safety Supervision Strategy from the Perspective of Differential Game Theory

作　　者：陈宝春 陈建国[1] 黄素萍[2] CHEN Baochun;CHEN Jianguo;HUANG Suping(School of Economics and Management,Tongji University,Shanghai 200092,China;Yiwu Industrial&Commercial College,Yiwu 322000,China)

机构地区：[1]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海200092 [2]义乌工商职业技术学院,浙江义乌322000

出　　处：《建筑经济》2018年第8期107-111,共5页Construction Economy

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71704162);教育部人文社科青年基金项目(17YJC630184)

摘　　要：基于微分博弈理论,着重考虑施工现场事故隐患累计变化的影响,构建连续时间下事故隐患随时间变化的动态方程。基于政府与施工企业微分博弈分析模型,求得动态框架下政府和企业不断协调和相互适应的反馈纳什均衡解。数值仿真实证检验发现:施工企业事故隐患量与建筑安全政绩考核的重要程度呈负相关、与政府的处罚力度负关联、与本身违规施工收益成正比;政府的均衡监管努力是建筑安全政绩考核的重要性的增函数、与自身监管成本呈负相关,与上级政府的奖罚正相关。最后,结合理论分析提出政府建筑安全监管的相关建议。Based on the theory of differential game,this paper considers the influence of the construction site accident cumulative change,constructs the dynamic equation hidden dangers of accidents with the time change under continuous time.Based on the differential game analysis model between government and construction enterprises,gives the dynamic feedback Nash equilibrium solution under the framework of government and enterprises continuous coordination and mutual adaptation.Through numerical simulation of accident analysis,finds that the the hidden volume in the construction enterprises is negatively related to the importance of the construction safety performance assessment,and the punishment of the government,is directly proportional to its own illegal construction income.The government supervision efforts are increasing function of importance of construction safety performance evaluation,and is negatively correlated with its regulatory costs,and positively correlated with higher levels of government reward.Finally,combined with theoretical analysis,puts forward some suggestions about the government building safety supervision.

关 键 词：建筑业 政府 施工企业 安全监管 微分博弈 

分 类 号：F407.9[经济管理—产业经济]