研发补贴政策、中间品贸易自由化与企业研发投入  

R&D Subsidy Policy,Trade Liberalisation of Intermediate Inputs and Firms' R&D Investment

作　　者：李杰 王兴棠[1] 李捷瑜 Li Jie;Wang Xingtang;Li Jieyu

机构地区：[1]暨南大学产业经济研究院 [2]暨南大学产业组织与规制研究所 [3]中山大学岭南学院

出　　处：《世界经济》2018年第8期129-148,共20页The Journal of World Economy

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(15BJL087);暨南大学高水平大学建设经费的资助

摘　　要：本文通过构建垂直市场结构下的讨价还价博弈模型,探讨在中间品贸易自由化的大背景下,研发补贴政策对下游企业研发投入及社会福利的影响。我们发现:在需要进口中间品的贸易格局下,研发补贴和中间品贸易自由化都会促进下游企业的研发投入,但不一定带来社会福利的改善。从社会福利最大化的角度考虑,中间品贸易自由化政策和研发补贴政策具有替代关系,即社会最优的补贴力度随中间品进口关税的下降而下降。这种替代性的强弱与企业研发效率、企业议价能力以及最终产品差异性有关。本文结论意味着在贸易自由化背景下,政府应合理调整研发补贴政策,否则可能造成过度研发,进而损害社会福利。In this paper,we explore how R&D subsidy policy affects downstream firms R&D investment and social welfare in the context of declining intermediate input tariffs by constructing a bargaining game model in a vertical market.We find that in the case of intermediate product trade,lower tariffs on intermediate products,together with R&D subsidies,can stimulate the R&D investment of the downstream firms,but this may not necessarily lead to improvements in social welfare;From the perspective of social welfare maximisation,the liberalisation policy of intermediate product trade acts as a substitute for R&D subsidy policy,for example,the socially optimum R&D subsidy should decrease with the decline of intermediate input tariffs.The degree of this substitution is associated with R&D efficiency,bargaining power and the final product differentiation.Our findings imply that,against the background of intermediate product trade liberalisation,the Chinese government should adjust its R&D subsidy policy in a reasonable way.Otherwise,this may lead to an excessive R&D investment of downstream firms,which will be detrimental to social welfare.

关 键 词：关税 补贴 讨价还价 

分 类 号：F11[经济管理—国际贸易] O25[经济管理—世界经济]