买方抗衡势力下忠诚折扣的排他效应分析  

An Analysis of the Exclusive Effect of Loyalty Discounts in the Case of Countervailing Power

作　　者：司马林 杜晶晶 SI-MA Lin;DU Jing-jing

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院

出　　处：《产经评论》2018年第4期19-29,共11页Industrial Economic Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目"抗衡势力背景下产业链纵向控制的机理研究"(项目编号:71472032;项目负责人:李凯)

摘　　要：忠诚折扣作为一种与通道费类似的纵向控制手段,当买方势力体现为买方抗衡势力时,是否会带来类似的排他结果,需作论证。从买方抗衡势力视角构建三阶段动态博弈模型,考察忠诚折扣在下游市场上的排他问题。研究结果显示,买方抗衡势力总体上促进了忠诚折扣在下游市场上的排他,依据是大型零售商能够通过忠诚折扣契约攫取来自小型零售商的产业利润,并通过谈判形式与制造商进行利润分配。换句话说,买方抗衡势力在一定程度上改善了无买方抗衡势力下的"囚徒困境"。从消费者福利角度分析,买方抗衡势力虽然导致了批发价格和零售价格的降低,但下降幅度有限,并且当下游市场缺乏足够竞争时,消费者并不能真正享受到买方抗衡势力带来的好处。从反垄断规制方面看,反垄断部门在审视忠诚折扣商业行为时,宜更多关注忠诚折扣的发起者和其特性,对其予以不同程度的反垄断规制,并且为了防范忠诚折扣引致的下游市场排他,需充分保障下游市场的有效竞争。Loyalty discounts as a means of vertical control similar to the slotting allowances,whether it will bring similar exclusive results in the case of countervailing power,further research is needed.This paper constructs a multi-stage dynamic game model,and examines the exclusive problem of loyalty discount in the downstream market from the perspective of countervailing power.We find that the countervailing power has generally contributed to the exclusion of loyalty discounts in the downstream market,the reason is that large retailer can use loyalty discount contract to capture profits from small retailer and negotiate profit distribution with the manufacturer.In other words,the countervailing power has improved“prisoners dilemma”to a certain extent.In terms of consumer welfare,the countervailing power will indeedlead to a reduction in wholesale and retail price,but the decline is limited;furthermore,there will be fewer benefits left for consumers when there is no sufficient competition in the downstream market.In terms of policy recommendations,the antitrust authorities should focus on the initiators of loyalty discounts and their contracting characteristics,and in order to prevent the downstream market exclusion caused by loyalty discounts,it should fully guarantee the effective competition in the downstream market.

关 键 词：忠诚折扣 买方抗衡势力 排他 反垄断 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]