财务负责人“旋转门”现象与公司盈余管理行为  

The “Revolving Door” Phenomenon of CFOs and Corporate Earnings Management

作　　者：余玉苗[1] 胡媛媛 YU Yumiao;HU Yuanyuan(School of Economics and Management,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2018年第5期55-66,共12页Journal of Audit & Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71672131;71872136)

摘　　要：以2007—2016年中国A股上市公司为研究对象,探讨了财务负责人的"旋转门"现象是否以及如何影响公司盈余管理行为。研究发现,存在财务负责人"旋转门"现象的上市公司减少了正向应计盈余管理,同时显著提升了真实盈余管理水平,盈余管理行为趋于隐蔽化。当"旋转门"中的财务负责人曾担任过本公司签字注册会计师时,公司盈余管理行为隐蔽化的倾向更为明显。进一步分析发现,"旋转门"现象并不利于公司业绩的提升。在稳健性检验中,采用倾向得分匹配法(PSM)选取配对样本后,主要结论仍然成立。结论表明,财务负责人的"旋转门"现象会显著影响公司盈余管理行为,有必要引起会计师事务所、外部投资者和相关监管部门的高度重视。Using the financial data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007-2016,this paper focuses on the question that the“revolving door”phenomenon of CFOs whether and how to impact the firms’earnings management activities.We find that the earnings management behavior of firms with“revolving door”CFO seem to be hidden by replacing accrual-based earnings management with real activities manipulation.And the impact of the“revolving door”on firms’earnings management activities is more obvious when the affiliated CFO is also the former auditor of this firm.In further analyses,we test the impact of the“revolving door”phenomenon of CFOs on firm performance,and the results show that firms’performance doesn’t benefit from the“revolving door”CFOs at all.in the robustness tests,the propensity score matching(PSM)method is applied and the main results are robust.Overall,these results Indicate that it is necessary for the audit firms,the stakeholders as well as the policy makers to pay attention to the impacts of“revolving door”phenomenon of CFOs.

关 键 词：“旋转门”现象 财务负责人 应计盈余管理 真实盈余管理 A股上市公司 

分 类 号：F239.43[经济管理—会计学]