基于溢出效应的技术创新利益主体行为的博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Technology Innovation Stakeholders' Behaviour Based on Spillover Effect

作　　者：刘耀辉 白晓斌 蔡忠林 何正文[2,3] Liu Yaohui;Bai Xiaobin;Cai Zhonglin;He Zhengwen(State Grid Shaanxi Electric Power Company,Baoji Power Supply Company,Baoji 721004,China;School of Management,Xi an Jiaotong University,Xi an 710049,China;Key Laboratory for Process Control&Efficiency Engineering(Xi an Jiaotong University), Ministry of Education,Xi an 710049,China)

机构地区：[1]国网陕西省电力公司宝鸡供电公司,宝鸡721004 [2]西安交通大学管理学院,西安710049 [3]过程控制与效率工程教育部重点实验室(西安交通大学),西安710049

出　　处：《工业技术经济》2018年第10期129-136,共8页Journal of Industrial Technological Economics

摘　　要：本文从技术创新的溢出效应出发,研究了相关利益主体的行为选择决策博弈问题。本文首先讨论了技术创新溢出效应产生的根源及其所带来的后果;随后,研究直接利益主体之间关于技术创新行为选择的相互作用关系,通过对比存在和不存在溢出效应两种条件下的静态博弈结果,揭示了溢出效应对创新主体行为决策的内在作用机理;进一步地,研究作为间接利益主体的政府对直接利益主体技术创新行为选择的影响,分析了两者基于溢出效应的静态博弈结果;最后,深入研究了企业和政府关于政策支持的动态博弈,构建了完美信息动态博弈模型并求解得到其子博弈完美纳什均衡解。本文的研究可以为政府制定相关政策和直接利益主体进行技术创新决策提供理论支持。Based on the spillover effect of technology innovation,this paper investigates the static game problem of relative stakeholders behavior choice decision.Firstly,the authors describe the spillover effect s origin and its outcome.Then,the interaction relationship among direct stakeholders for the decision on technology innovation is analyzed.Through the comparison of the sta-tic game results under the conditions with and without the spillover effect,the internal mechanism of its impact on the direct stakeholder s decision is revealed.Furthermore,the influence of the government,which is regarded as the indirect stakeholder for technology innovation,on the direct stakeholder s behavior is studied as well.The results of the static game between the direct and indirect stakeholders are discussed in the light of the spillover effect.At last,the dynamic game about policy supports between enterprises and the government is investigated intensively.The perfect information dynamic game model is constructed and through solving this model,the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium solutions are obtained.The research in the paper can provide theoretic supports for the government to prepare relative policies and the direct stakeholder to make decisions on technology innovation.

关 键 词：技术创新 溢出效应 利益主体 静态博弈 动态博弈 政策支持 

分 类 号：F091.354[经济管理—政治经济学] F224.32