高铁运营安全监督系统奖惩机制优化研究  

Optimization of Reward and Punishment Mechanism for High-speed Railway Operation Safety Supervision System

作　　者：李科宏 张亚东[1] 郭进[1] LI Ke-hong;ZHANG Ya-dong;GUO Jin(School of Information Science and Technology,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031,China)

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学信息科学与技术学院,成都610031

出　　处：《交通运输系统工程与信息》2018年第5期18-25,共8页Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(青年)(61703349);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(2682017CX101);中国铁路总公司科技研究开发计划课题(2017X007-D)~~

摘　　要：针对我国高速铁路委托运输管理模式下,高铁运营安全监督系统尚未形成有效的奖惩机制等问题,运用演化博弈论来分析国家铁路局、高铁公司和委托路局三方在高铁运营安全监督过程中的决策,通过对系统静态演化博弈模型进行优化,分别建立了基于动态奖励,动态奖惩和优化动态奖惩场景的系统演化博弈模型.通过对模型进行理论证明,结合系统动力学仿真,分析和验证了3种场景下模型存在均衡点的稳定性.结果表明,在优化动态奖惩场景下,国家铁路局的安全监管率下降的同时,高铁公司的安全监督率和委托路局的安全投入率都得到了有效提高,使三方在长期博弈过程中达到最优状态.本文对于完善高铁委托运输管理制度,提高运营安全水平,有很强的参考和借鉴意义.In view of the entrusted transportation management model of high-speed railway(HSR)in China,the effective reward and punishment mechanism hasn’t been formed during operation for the safety supervision system of HSR.The evolutionary game theory is used to analyze the decisions made by State Railway Administration(SRA),HSR company and commissioned railways bureau(RB)during the operation safety supervision process of the system,through the optimization of the model under static scenario,three dynamic reward and punishment models is proposed respectively.The stability of the equilibrium point of these three models is analyzed and verified based on theoretical proof and System Dynamics(SD)simulation.The results show that under the optimized dynamic reward punishment scenario,the safety regulation rate of the SRA has decreased,in the meantime,safety supervision rate of HSR and safety investment rate of commissioned RB is improved effectively.The optimum state in the long term game process of three parties is achieved.This is beneficial for the perfection of entrusted transportation management system and the operation safety level of HSR.

关 键 词：铁路运输 运营安全监督 系统动力学 演化博弈 演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：U238[交通运输工程—道路与铁道工程]