破产威胁视角的债权治理与大股东掏空抑制  

The Effects of Debt Governance on Restraining Large Shareholders' Tunneling Based on the Perspective of Threat of Bankruptcy

作　　者：何融 刘少波 HE Rong;LIU Shao-bo

机构地区：[1]暨南大学 [2]暨南大学经济学院

出　　处：《产经评论》2018年第5期83-100,共18页Industrial Economic Review

基　　金：广东省省级科技计划项目"早期投资生态系统的研究与实践探索"(项目编号:2013A080300003;项目主持人:陈波)

摘　　要：我国上市公司大股东掏空现象较为普遍,探索抑制大股东掏空的机制对于保护中小股东利益、促进我国证券市场发展需要从债权治理方面作深入研究。由于长期以来我国债务融资"软约束"的存在,债权治理在约束大股东掏空中的作用很少受到关注,从破产威胁以及大股东掏空成本的角度分析债权治理抑制大股东掏空的机制,运用我国上市公司数据进行实证考察,结果表明:(1)债权治理能够降低大股东的资金占用行为,但是不同主体及不同期限的债权治理对大股东掏空的抑制作用存在差别,即银行借款的抑制作用最弱、商业信用最强、发行债券介于前二者之间,短期债权的抑制作用要弱于长期债权;(2)债权相机治理机制不仅与债务合同本身所具有的"硬约束"特征有关,而且与债权治理的主体类型和债权的期限相关。Due to the common phenomenon of large shareholders tunneling behavior in listed companies,it is vital to research some mechanism to control large shareholders tunneling,which is important for protecting minor shareholders interest and capital market development.Because of the“soft constraint”in debt financing,the debt governance of restraining large shareholders tunneling behavior was been ignored in the past.This paper investigates the mechanism of debt governance on restraining large shareholders tunneling behavior from the perspectives of threat of bankruptcy and tunneling cost,and then empirical studies with data from China s listed companies.The results show that debt governance can reduce large shareholders tunneling through fund appropriation,but the governance effects of debt of different sources and of different terms vary.The orders from strongest to weakest by different sources debt are commercial credit,bond and bank loan and the constraints effect of short-term debt is weaker than long-term debt from the aspect of different terms debt.The results also show that the governance effects of contingent control mechanism is not only related to the characteristic of“hard constraint”from the debt contract but also related to the types of creditors and the debt s maturity.

关 键 词：大股东掏空 债权治理 破产威胁 相机治理 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学]