“互联网+信息”形势下的互联网安全监管演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Internet Security Supervision against the Background of "Internet Plus Information"

作　　者：马国顺 马元晋 MA Guo-shun;MA Yuan-jin(School of Mathematics and Statistics,Northwest Normal University Lanzhou 730070,China)

机构地区：[1]西北师范大学数学与统计学院,甘肃兰州730070

出　　处：《兰州财经大学学报》2018年第5期110-116,共7页Journal of Lanzhou University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71061012);甘肃省自然科学基金项目(145RJZA102)

摘　　要：随着现代化网络技术的发展,互联网已经成为人们日常生活中不可或缺的工具。而网络在给人们生活带来便利的同时也带来了信息泄露风险,因此对互联网的安全监管是非常有必要的。建立监管部门与信息服务体之间的博弈模型,通过混合战略纳什均衡解和演化稳定策略来对互联网监管进行博弈分析。同时结合博弈分析考虑了政府激励机制、社会风险等因素对互联网监管博弈的影响,并给出了相应的监管建议。With the development of modern technology,Internet has become an indispensable tool in daily life.It is extremely necessary to guarantee the safe supervision of the Internet because when bringing convenience to people's lives,Internet also brings the risk of information disclosure.A game model between the supervisory department and the information service body is established,trying to analyze Internet supervision by using the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution and the evolutionary stable strategy.At the same time,the incentive mechanism of government and social risks is also concerned and the relative suggestion is put forward.

关 键 词：互联网+ 监管博弈 混合战略纳什均衡 演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：TP393.08[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]