Effects of Pilot Programs for China's Central SOE Board of Directors  

作　　者：Li Wengui Yu Minggui Zhong Huijie 李文贵;余明桂;钟慧洁

机构地区：[1]School of Accounting, Zhejiang University of Finance & Economics [2]School of Economic & Management, Wuhan University

出　　处：《China Economist》2018年第6期106-120,共15页中国经济学人（英文版）

基　　金：supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) programs (71502161 and 71672134);Key Programs of Philosophical and Social Science Planning of Zhejiang Province (17NDJC025Z);Natural Science Foundation Program of Zhejiang Province (LQ14G020011);"Zhi Jiang Young Social Science Scholar" Program of Zhejiang Province (G267)

摘　　要：Since June 2004, the State-Owned Assets Supervision & Administration Commission(SASAC) has launched pilot programs for a board of directors(BoD) for central SOEs to establish and improve their governance structure and standardize their exercise of shareholder rights over state-owned listed companies. Based on this quasinatural experiment, this paper examines the BoD's effects on the agency cost of state-owned listed companies and their economic consequences. Using data of central SOE-controlled companies listed at Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges during 2002-2015, this paper finds that the pilot programs significantly reduced the two types of agency costs for the companies, and such effects primarily existed for listed companies with smaller central SOE shareholding ratios. Further test uncovers that, compared with central SOEs that did not carry out the pilot programs, those that did reported higher economic value-added and stock returns. Our conclusions offer a new interpretation of the BoD's governance effects from a controlling shareholder's perspective, and provide empirical evidence for the positive effects of the pilot programs for central SOE boards of directors. These findings have important policy implications for deepening SOE governance reforms.Since June 2004, the State-Owned Assets Supervision & Administration Commission(SASAC) has launched pilot programs for a board of directors(BoD) for central SOEs to establish and improve their governance structure and standardize their exercise of shareholder rights over state-owned listed companies. Based on this quasinatural experiment, this paper examines the BoD's effects on the agency cost of state-owned listed companies and their economic consequences. Using data of central SOE-controlled companies listed at Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges during 2002-2015, this paper finds that the pilot programs significantly reduced the two types of agency costs for the companies, and such effects primarily existed for listed companies with smaller central SOE shareholding ratios. Further test uncovers that, compared with central SOEs that did not carry out the pilot programs, those that did reported higher economic value-added and stock returns. Our conclusions offer a new interpretation of the BoD's governance effects from a controlling shareholder's perspective, and provide empirical evidence for the positive effects of the pilot programs for central SOE boards of directors. These findings have important policy implications for deepening SOE governance reforms.

关 键 词：CENTRAL SOE BOARD of directors AGENCY cost SHAREHOLDING ratio CORPORATE performance 

分 类 号：G32[文化科学] G38