论霍耐特物化批判的社会存在论基础  

The Social Ontological Foundation of Honneth's Critique of Reification

作　　者：洪楼 Hong Lou

机构地区：[1]厦门大学马克思主义学院

出　　处：《世界哲学》2018年第6期40-48,157,共10页World Philosophy

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目"霍耐特的社会批判理论研究"(项目编号:17YJC710024)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：霍耐特意图在其承认理论基础之上对"物化"这一批判理论的重要概念进行再现实化。他对卢卡奇的物化理论进行了批判性重构,并指出卢卡奇的同情且参与的实践概念已经隐含地指向一种关于真正人类实践形式的表述。通过把这一解读与海德格尔的操心和杜威的实践牵涉进行比较性的分析,霍耐特进一步把这些概念与其自身的承认理论关联起来,并提出了物化批判的社会存在论基础,即物化是对先在的基本承认的遗忘。尽管基本承认概念的社会存在论含义与具体承认的规范性内容之间存在着张力,但这一新的诠释依然是在当代批判理论中复兴物化概念的一次重要尝试。Honneth attempts to reactualize the concept of reification in contemporary critical theory,which is based on his theory of recognition.He critically reconstructs Lukács theory of reification and argues that Lukács concept of engaged praxis has implicitly pointed to a statement about genuine or true human practice.By comparing this interpretation with Heidegger s Sorge and Dewey s practical involvement,Honneth further links these ideas with his own theory of recognition,and puts forward the social ontological foundation of his critique of reification,namely that reification is the forgetting of the antecedent and elementary recognition.Despite the tension between the social ontological meaning of elementary recognition and the normative content of specific recognition,this new interpretation is still an important attempt to revive the concept of reification in contemporary critical theory.

关 键 词：物化 同情且参与的实践 操心 实践的牵涉 基本承认 

分 类 号：B089.1[哲学宗教—哲学理论]