分时电价与电动汽车优化调度的主从博弈模型  

Leader-follower Game Model of Time-of-use Electricity Price and Optimized Plug-in Electric Vehicle Dispatching

作　　者：杨国清[1,2] 罗航 王德意[1,2] 付菁 贾嵘[1,2] 姚李孝[1,2] YANG Guoqing;LUO Hang;WANG Deyi;FU Jing;JIA Rong;YAO Lixiao(School of Water Resources and Hydro-Electric Engineering,Xi’an University of Technology,Xi’an 710048,China;State Key Laboratory Breeding Base of Eco-Hydraulic Engineering in the Northwest Arid Area(Xi’an University of Technology),Xi’an 710048,China)

机构地区：[1]西安理工大学水利水电学院,西安710048 [2]西北旱区生态水利工程国家重点实验室(西安理工大学),西安710048

出　　处：《电力系统及其自动化学报》2018年第10期55-60,共6页Proceedings of the CSU-EPSA

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(51279161);西北旱区生态水利工程国家重点实验室基金资助项目(2016ZZKT-12)

摘　　要：合理调控电动汽车充放电计划能够充分发挥其对电网负荷削峰填谷的能力。本文针对分时电价制定及电动汽车入网调度策略,建立了基于两方决策者动态非合作博弈的主从博弈模型。该模型以电网分时电价为主体,极小化负荷均方差为主体运行目标;以电动汽车为从体,极小化车主成本为从体优化目标。并采用粒子群优化算法,利用模型解耦性由内至外求解纳什均衡点。最后通过算例对所提模型进行仿真,验证该主从博弈模型的经济效益与调峰效果。Reasonable adjustment of charging/discharging plan of plug-in electric vehicles(PEVs)gives full play to the peak load clipping capacity of grid load.In this paper,a leader-follower game model based on a dynamic non-coopera.tive game of decision-makers in both parties was established under the stipulation of time-of-use(TOU)electricity price and the dispatching strategy of PEVs connected to grid.The main body of the proposed model was TOU electricity price,and its operation objective was to minimize the load’s mean-square error;meanwhile,the subordinated body was PE.Vs,and its optimization objective was to minimize the cost of PEV owners.The Nash equilibrium point was obtained uti.lizing the decoupling characteristic of this model from inside to outside by particle swarm optimization algorithm.Final.ly,simulations were carried out with a numerical example,which verified the economic and security benefits of the pro.posed leader-follower game model.

关 键 词：主从博弈 削峰填谷 电动汽车 分时电价 纳什均衡 

分 类 号：TM73[电气工程—电力系统及自动化]