利率市场化、地方政府干预与信贷配置效率——基于2003-2015年省际面板数据的分析  

Interest Rate Marketization,Local Government Intervention and Credit Allocation Efficiency:An Analysis based on Inter-provincial Panel Data from 2003 to 2015

作　　者：马娟[1] 万解秋[2] MA Juan;WAN Jie-qiu(Business School,Nantong University,Nantong 226019,China;Business School,Soochow University,Suzhou 215021,China)

机构地区：[1]南通大学商学院,江苏南通226019 [2]苏州大学商学院,江苏苏州215021

出　　处：《商业研究》2018年第11期38-47,共10页Commercial Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目;项目编号:16BJL103;南通市社科基金项目;项目编号:2016BNT008

摘　　要：基于我国地方政府经常干预银行信贷配置的现实,本文运用2003-2015年的省际面板数据,从省际信贷配置效率视角实证考察利率市场化改革的信贷配置效应及地方政府干预的影响。研究表明:利率市场化有助于省际信贷配置效率的提升,但地方政府干预显著干扰了商业银行信贷投放的商业导向;地方政府干预的负向影响冲销了利率市场化改革的信贷配置正向效应,即使剔除国际金融危机时期特殊信贷政策的影响,我国商业银行的省际信贷配置依然缺乏理性,信贷资源省际配置效率整体低下。Considering the fact that local governments intervened in bank lending allocation in China,this paper uses the inter-provincial panel data from 2003 to 2015 to empirically investigate the credit allocation effect of interest rate liberalization reform and the influence of local government intervention from the perspective of inter-provincial credit allocation efficiency.The research shows that market-oriented reforms of interest rates help improve inter-provincial credit allocation efficiency,but intervention of local governments significantly interferes with the commercial orientation of bank lending;the negative impact caused by local government intervention is so significant that it offsets the positive effect of credit allocation brought by interest rate liberalization,as a result,even excluding the likely impact of special credit policies during the financial crisis,commercial banks have failed to rationally allocate credit funds among provinces,and the inter-provincial allocation of credit resources is inefficient on the whole.

关 键 词：利率市场化 地方政府干预 信贷配置效率 银行信贷行为 省际信贷配置 

分 类 号：F832.3[经济管理—金融学]