大豆目标价格政策缘何在中国走不通?——基于EDM的福利效应分析  

Why Is Soybean Goal Price Policy Impractical in China:Welfare Effect Analysis Based on EDM

作　　者：蔡海龙[1] 马英辉 CAI Hailong;MA Yinghui

机构地区：[1]中国农业大学经济管理学院,北京100083 [2]江苏科技大学经济管理学院,江苏镇江212003

出　　处：《南京农业大学学报（社会科学版）》2018年第6期137-145,161,162,共11页Journal of Nanjing Agricultural University(Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"中国大豆目标价格实施的福利变化和要素分配效应分析"(71503250);国家现代农业产业技术体系(大豆)建设专项(CARS-04-12B)

摘　　要：大豆目标价格政策在中国东北地区试点三年后退出,继而实施生产者补贴政策。大豆目标价格政策的退出既有政策实施层面操作成本过高的问题,也有经济学层面政策效率不高的问题。本文构建了大豆市场的均衡移动模型(EDM),并将进口大豆和国产大豆的替代弹性纳入分析框架,研究大豆目标价格政策的福利效应,为大豆目标价格政策的退出提供一个经济学解释。研究表明,政府差价补贴支出对目标价格水平变化非常敏感,若大豆目标价格提高1%,政府总补贴支出将增加8.3%,即每吨大豆增加100元差价补贴,财政支出将增加10亿元;目标价格政策的经济效率不高,政府支出中的35.5%变成了无谓的福利损失,对国产大豆产出增加作用甚微,而且市场开放程度越高、供给弹性越大,福利损失就越多。Soybean Goal Price Policy has been withdrawn from implementation in the Northeast China,which was instituted three years ago,and is followed up with the Producer Subsidy Policy.The with.drawal of the Soybean Goal Price Policy was caused by not only by the high cost of policy implementation,but also by the low efficiency of economic policy.In this paper,the EDM Model for Soybean Market was developed,taking the replacement elasticity of imported and homemade soybean into the frame of the Model.The welfare effect of Soybean Goal Price Policy was analyzed and its final withdrawal was economically interpreted.The study showed that the government price difference subsidy was highly sensitive to Soybean Goal Price changes.If Soybean Goal Price increases by 1%,the governmenttotal subsidy will increase by 8.3%,that is,an increase of 100 RMB in subsidy for each ton of soybean:1 billion RMB in total.The Goal Price Policy is not economically efficient,and 33.5%of government expense has been turned into meaningless welfare loss,with very limited incentive for boosting the soybean production.Moreover,the more open the market is,and the more elastic supply is,the more welfare will be lost.

关 键 词：目标价格 替代弹性 均衡移动模型 福利变化 

分 类 号：F304[经济管理—产业经济]