政府随机审计的动态博弈模型及政策启示  

The Dynamic Game Model and Its Policy Implications of the Random Government Audit

作　　者：岳贤平 YUE Xianping(Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing 211815)

机构地区：[1]南京审计大学商学院

出　　处：《经济与管理研究》2018年第12期37-48,共12页Research on Economics and Management

摘　　要：本文在一个三阶段动态博弈框架下,对政府随机审计过程中的政府审计机关与政府审计对象以及国家与政府审计对象之间的动态博弈特征进行了分析。分析结果显示:政府审计机关与政府审计对象之间存在一个纯策略纳什均衡,而国家和政府审计对象之间存在一个混合策略纳什均衡。政府审计对象接受国家实质性审计的概率是政府审计对象被政府机关审计发现违规或不作为后的惩罚倍数的单调递减函数,而政府审计对象的违规或不作为的概率分别是政府审计对象被政府机关审计发现违规或不作为后的惩罚倍数和政府审计对象的应尽义务或责任的单调递减函数,却是政府审计机关审计行为成本的单调递增函数。同时,结合研究结论和中国政府审计全覆盖的现实,给出了一些政策建议。This paper analyzes the dynamic game characteristics both between the government audit object and government audit institutions and between the state and the government audit object in the process of random government audit in the three-stage dynamic game framework.It is show that there is a pure strategy Nash equilibria between the government audit institutions and the government audit object,and a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium between the state and the government audit object.The probability of being audit accepted by the government audit object is a monotonic decreasing function of the punitive multiple after the government audit object is found violation or not doing thing.This paper also shows that the probability that the government audit object is violation or inaction is a monotonic decreasing function of both the punitive multiple and the obligation or responsibility of the government audit object but a monotonic increasing function of the audit action cost of the government audit institutions.In the end,it presents some countermeasures and suggestions based on both the conclusion of this paper and the reality of the full coverage of government audit in China.

关 键 词：审计全覆盖 政府审计 随机审计 动态博弈 审计悖论 

分 类 号：F239[经济管理—会计学]