政府间的税收竞争与环境污染的非线性关系研究——基于面板门槛模型的实证分析  

A Nonlinear Relationship about Government Tax Competition and the Environment Pollution:Based on the Empirical Analysis of Panel Threshold Model

作　　者：张宏翔[1] 席丽娟 ZHANG Hong-xiang;XI Li-juan(School of Economics and Management,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430073,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430073

出　　处：《西安财经学院学报》2018年第6期13-21,共9页Journal of Xi’an University of Finance & Economics

摘　　要：文章利用我国2004—2016年省级面板数据,基于人均GDP的门槛特征,区分不同的经济水平区间,研究政府间税收竞争与环境污染间的非线性关系。研究发现:政府竞争对于环境污染的影响存在以人均GDP作为识别变量的门槛效应;以财政总收入指标衡量的政府竞争会改善工业废水、废气问题,但会恶化固体废物问题,且经济水平越高作用效果越强;单纯的税收竞争将会恶化工业废水、废气问题,改善固体废物问题;对于工业废气污染,无论是以哪一类税种为主的横向税收竞争活动都会导致这一问题的加重;限制地方政府税收权力可以缓解废水、废气问题,但会恶化固体废弃物问题。Based on China’s 2004-2016 provincial panel data,this paper uses the threshold characteristics of per capita GDP to distinguish the different economic level interval,and then makes a research on the nonlinear relationship about government tax competition and the environment pollution.We found that:there exists a threshold effect based on per capita GDP in the government competition effect on the environment pollution.The income of financial government competition can improve the problem of industrial waste water and waste gas,but deteriorate solid waste problems,and the higher economic level the stronger of the effect.When only considering a simple tax competition,it will deteriorate the problem of industrial waste water and waste gas,but improve solid waste problems.For industrial waste gas pollution,horizontal taxation competition activities will lead to an increase in this problem.Restricting local government taxation power can alleviate waste water and waste gas problem,but deteriorate solids waste problem.

关 键 词：政府竞争 环境污染 财政收入负担 中央税收征管权集中度 

分 类 号：F810.42[经济管理—财政学] X5[环境科学与工程—环境工程]