整合公路运输服务下竞争性港口定价博弈模型  

Pricing Game Model of Competitive Port Integrating Highway Transportation Service

作　　者：王文渊[1] 王盛华 彭云[1] 徐星璐 WANGWen-yuan;WANG Sheng-hua;PENG Yun;XU Xing-lu(School of Hydraulic Engineering, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024, Liaoning, China;Guangzhou Port Group Co., Ltd., Guangzhou 510100, China)

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学水利工程学院,辽宁大连116024 [2]广州港集团有限公司,广州510100

出　　处：《交通运输系统工程与信息》2018年第6期229-235,共7页Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(51709037;51779037)~~

摘　　要：为研究港口差异化服务对网络中竞争企业带来的影响,构建了基于MNL模型与博弈理论的整合公路运输服务下的港口定价双层规划博弈模型,通过改进的均衡求解数值算法求解Nash均衡.通过算例研究,分析了整合公路运输服务前后的市场变化、最优定价策略与服务路径选择策略,以及用户选择偏好系数对于均衡价格的影响.分析结果表明:整合公路运输服务能有效提升企业策略的自由度及利润水平;纯价格决策对市场竞争力提升有限,在竞争中处于被动方;在本例中,用户对于价格因素越敏感,企业的价格策略越能获得成效;但价格策略空间有限,企业无法完全通过纯价格策略获得市场主导地位,通过开拓新服务,企业能够在竞争中获得优势,取得更高的利润.In order to study the impact of port differentiation strategy proposing in network nodes,a port pricing bi-level optimization game model is built based on the multinomial Logit(MNL)model and game theory,and a numerical algorithm is developed to solve the Nash equilibrium.With a numerical example,the market share change,optimal pricing and service routing strategies as well as the influence of user preference factor on equilibrium price are studied.The results indicate that:the new service promotes the freedom of company strategies and profit level;the pure pricing strategy has a limit to earn the market competiveness,and it’s more passive in the market.In this example,it is pointed that when users are more interested in the price factor,the pricing strategies is more effective.However,pricing strategy has limited range.Company cannot fully dominants the market by pure pricing strategy while with new service,company can gain the advantage from the competition and make a higher profit.

关 键 词：交通运输经济 价格竞争 博弈论 差异化服务 数值算法 

分 类 号：U-9[交通运输工程]