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作 者:张欣 高鑫[2] ZHANG Xin;GAO Xin(International Economic & Technical Cooperation and Exchange Center,Ministry of Water Resources,Beijing 100038,China;Business School of Hohai University,Nanjing 210098,China)
机构地区:[1]水利部国际经济技术合作交流中心,北京100038 [2]河海大学商学院,南京210098
出 处:《价值工程》2018年第36期110-112,共3页Value Engineering
基 金:国家重点研发计划资助项目"跨境水资源科学调控与利益共享研究"(2016YFA0601600)中的课题"跨境流域水资源利益共享及权益保障机制"(2016YFA061604)阶段性研究成果
摘 要:目前,建立市场化、多元化的生态补偿机制受到社会的广泛关注。本文应用博弈论分析方法,建立了流域上下游政府之间生态补偿博弈模型。研究结果显示:流域环境保护成本对生态补偿的执行产生负向影响,流域环境保护的额外收益、生态补偿额则对生态补偿的执行产生正向的影响。At present,the establishment of a market-oriented and diversified ecological compensation mechanism has received extensive attention from society.In this paper,the game theory analysis method is used to establish an ecological compensation game model between upstream and downstream governments.The research results show that the cost of environmental protection in the basin has a negative impact on the implementation of ecological compensation.The additional benefits of ecological protection in the basin and the amount of ecological compensation have a positive impact on the implementation of ecological compensation.
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