政府与企业生态责任的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Ecological Responsibility between Government and Corporate

作　　者：郭微微 孙泽厚[1] GUO Weiwei;SUN Zehou(School of Management,WUT,Wuhan 430070,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉理工大学管理学院,湖北武汉430074 [2]中原工学院经济管理学院,河南郑州450007

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（信息与管理工程版）》2018年第6期610-614,共5页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology：Information & Management Engineering

基　　金：河南省社会科学规划基金项目(2018BSH017;2017BJJ079);河南省高等学校重点科研基金项目(18A630068)

摘　　要：为了促进我国企业生态责任实施,运用演化博弈的方法探讨了政府监管行为与企业生态责任行为的决策演化过程,建立了演化博弈模型。研究结果表明,企业承担生态责任的策略选择主要由获得的额外收益所决定,影响额外收益的主要因素是企业承担生态责任的成本投入、企业承担生态责任的前期经济效益的损失和企业承担生态责任对环境的影响,这些因素制约了企业承担生态责任的发展。同时,政府对企业生态责任行为的有效监管能有效地促进企业承担生态责任,因此提出了促进企业承担生态责任的政策建议。In order to promote the implementation of corporate ecological responsibility,from the perspective of evolutionary game theory,the author discussed the evolution process of government regulatory and corporate ecological responsibility,established an evolutionary game model of government regulatory and corporate ecological responsibility behavior.The research results show that the strategic choice of corporate ecological responsibility is mainly determined by the additional income.The main factors affecting the extra revenue are the cost investment,the loss of the early economic benefits of the enterprise undertaking ecological responsibility,the impact on the environment when the company carries out ecological responsibility.These factors constrain the development of corporate ecological responsibility.At the same time,the effective supervision of the government can promote the ecological responsibility of the company.therefore,this paper put forward policy recommendations to promote corporate responsibility for ecological responsibility.

关 键 词：生态责任 政府监管 演化博弈 企业生态责任 演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：C936[经济管理—管理学]