农村金融市场信贷博弈及对策探析  

Analysis of the Credit Game and Countermeasures in Rural Financial Market

作　　者：蓝勋[1,2] LAN Xun(Guangxi University of Finance and Economics,Nanning 530003 China)

机构地区：[1]广西财经学院"复旦-广西海上丝绸之路与区域发展研究院",南宁530003 [2]马来西亚百纳利大学

出　　处：《广西经济管理干部学院学报》2018年第4期36-40,共5页Journal of GuangXi Cadres College of Economic and Management

基　　金：广西教育科学“十二五”规划2015年度重点课题“‘21世纪海上丝绸之路’视角下中国-东盟高等教育合作机制研究”(2015A025)

摘　　要：农户违约是农贷市场健康发展的掣肘和顽疾。文章从博弈论视角有效揭示农贷市场违约的微观机制。贷前信号博弈表明,农户的信息披露可以有效规避贷前的逆向选择问题、促使分离均衡的实现,有利于农贷市场资源配置和借贷双方福利改进。贷后战略博弈表明,银行实行合理监督、改进贷款契约设定,可以规避贷款后的道德风险、提高农户守约概率。据此,提出降低农贷市场违约的政策建议。Farmer's default which is the hindrance and persistent illness affect the healthy development of the agricultural credit market.This paper opens a new way to effectively reveal the micro-mechanism of default in the agricultural credit market from the perspective of game theory.The pre-loan signaling game shows that the information disclo-sure of farmers can effectively avoid the adverse selection problem before lending and promote the realization of separating equilibrium,which is conducive to the resources allocation in the agricultural credit market and the welfare improvement on both borrowers and lenders.The post-loan strategic game in this paper indicates that reasonable supervi-sion from banks and improvement of loan contract can avoid moral hazard and improve the probability of farmers,compliances.Accordingly,this paper puts forward some policy suggestions to reduce the default of agricultural credit market.

关 键 词：农村金融 信贷 博弈 对策 

分 类 号：F832.43[经济管理—金融学]