新能源汽车财政补贴政策监管演化稳定性分析  

Analysis of Supervision Stability of New Energy Vehicle Subsidy Policy Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

作　　者：陈洪转[1] 齐慧娟 Chen Hongzhuan;Qi Huijuan(College of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics,Nanjing 211106,China)

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,南京211106

出　　处：《工业技术经济》2019年第2期114-119,共6页Journal of Industrial Technological Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金"基于GERT网络的国产复杂装备协同研发机制及其财政补贴政策研究"(项目编号:71573115)

摘　　要：构建新能源汽车企业与政府补贴动态演化系统是优化补贴监管策略的前提和基础,但在实际监管策略的制定中往往忽略了其动态性与有限理性。本文引入演化博弈模型,研究有限理性条件下新能源汽车企业与政府"骗补——监管"的动态性,通过复制动态方程与雅克比矩阵分析判定演化稳定策略。研究表明:企业和政府的演化稳定策略存在是有条件的,有四种情形存在演化稳定策略,一种情形不存在演化稳定策略;并且在长期演化过程中,系统存在两种演化均衡,政府的演化均衡策略都是检查。The construction of a new energy auto companies and subsidy of government dynamic evolution system is the premise and basis for optimizing the subsidy supervision strategy.However,its dynamic and limited rationality are often neglected in the formulation of practical supervision strategies.This paper introduces evolutionary game model to study the dynamics of swindling supervision between new energy auto companies and governments under the condition of limited rationality,and determines evolutionary stability strategies by replicating dynamic equations and Jacobian matrix.The research shows that the evolutionary stabilization strategies between enterprises and governments exists conditionally.There are four situations in which evolutionary stabilization strategies exist,and there is no evolutionary stabilization strategy in one situation.In the long-term evolution process,there are two evolutionary equilibriums in the system.The government s evolutionary equilibrium strategy is checking.

关 键 词：新能源汽车 演化博弈 政策监管 有限理性 演化稳定策略 复制动态方程 

分 类 号：F812.4[经济管理—财政学] F426.471