供需随机条件下制造企业在包装外包中的协调决策研究  

Coordination of contractors in packaging outsourcing with random supply and random demand

作　　者：肖吉军[1] 师亚玲 郑颖琦 Xiao Jijun;Shi Yaling;Zheng Yingqi(Guilin University of Electronic Technology,Guilin 541004,Guangxi,China)

机构地区：[1]桂林电子科技大学,桂林541004

出　　处：《现代制造工程》2019年第1期32-37,共6页Modern Manufacturing Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71162017);广西教育厅人文社科重点项目(ZD2014055);桂林市科技研究与技术开发计划项目(软科学2016013602)

摘　　要：包装外包业务中,发包方在与承包方确定交易之前,需通过谈判议价与之达成合作关系。市场供应与需求的不确定性所造成的风险对企业的外包决策提出了挑战。鉴于企业在谈判议价过程中所获信息的非共享性,本文建立基于Bayesian博弈的谈判议价模型,并指出在双方达成合作意向时具有一个均衡价格。依设计的发包方与承包方在分散决策时的期望利润函数,利用Stackelberg博弈解得企业的最佳外包订货决策。以包装外包在集中决策时的最大化利润为优化目标,构建集额外收购与缺货惩罚于一体的协调契约。依据承包方的实际外包供给量,发包方可以采取额外收购或者缺货惩罚的措施,利用契约参数的调整来实现协调包装外包决策的目的。In the packaging outsourcing,in order to conclude a business,the contractor needs to bargain with the employer and to consider the risks from the random demand of customers and the random supply of the employer.Since the selling prices of both parties are private information in the bargaining,establishes a bargaining model based on Bayesian game and points out that there is an equilibrium price when the two sides reach the intention of cooperation.Then,constructing the expected profit function of the employer and the contractor in decentralized decision making,and model a Stackelberg game to get the optimal ordering and production decisions.Finally,proposing a contract combining shortage penalty and surplus purchase to coordinate the packaging outsourcing.Using the adjustment of contract parameters to achieve the purpose of coordinating packaging outsourcing decision.

关 键 词：外包 博弈论 议价 契约 

分 类 号：F489[经济管理—产业经济]