虚假口碑信息控制演化博弈研究  

The Evolutionary Game Theoretic Study on the Control of False Word-of-Mouth Information

作　　者：李杰[1] 张睿 徐勇[2] LI Jie;ZHANG Rui;XU Yong(School of Economics and Management,Hebei University of Technology,Tianjin 300401,China;School of Science,Hebei University of Technology,Tianjin 300401,China)

机构地区：[1]河北工业大学经济管理学院,天津300401 [2]河北工业大学理学院,天津300401

出　　处：《复杂系统与复杂性科学》2018年第3期39-46,共8页Complex Systems and Complexity Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金(16FGL014);河北省自然科学基金(G2019202350)

摘　　要：为探讨微观层面下社会化媒体虚假口碑信息控制策略,构建了社会化媒体平台与电商平台、社会化媒体平台与消费者两个演化博弈模型,求解确立了各方行为策略趋于理想稳定状态的参数条件。研究表明,虚假口碑信息控制与社会化媒体平台控制力度、电商平台主动协助控制概率、消费者对虚假口碑信息误认概率等因素密切相关,且依赖于三方的积极互动。应合理控制社会化媒体短期收益与治理力度,倡导其良性竞争;加强正向舆论导向,降低电商平台虚假口碑识别成本,督促其协助治理;提高消费者信息素养,完善奖励机制,激励其参与治理。This paper builds two evolutionary game models of E-commerce platform and social media platform,consumers and social media platform to investigate the control strategies of false Word-of-Mouth information in social media at micro level,and the conditions promoting the strategies of participators to ideal stable states are given by model solving.The research results show that the control of false Word-of-Mouth information is closely related with the control power of social media platform,the probability of E-commerce platform assisting control,the mistake probability of false Word-of-Mouth information for consumers,etc.And cooperative governance among E-commerce platform,social media platform and consumers is the key to solve the problem of false Word-of-Mouth information in social media.We should reasonably control the short-term benefits and governance of social media,advocate its benign competition.And we should strengthen the positive direction of public opinion,reduce the cost of false Word-of-Mouth identification of E-commerce platforms,urge them to help governance.And improving consumer information literacy,inspiring the incentive mechanism,and arousing them to participate in governance.

关 键 词：虚假口碑信息 社会化媒体 电商平台 消费者 演化博弈 

分 类 号：G206[文化科学—传播学]