多方博弈视角下既有建筑节能改造市场主体行为策略  

Players' Behavior Strategy of Energy Saving Market in Existing Building Based on Multi-party Game

作　　者：伍红民 郭汉丁 李柏桐[1,2] WU Hong-min;GUO Han-ding;LI Bai-tong(School of Economics and Management, Tianjin Chengjian University, Tianjin 300384, China;Eco Livable City and Sustainable Construction Management Research Center, Tianjin Chengjian University, Tianjin 300384, China)

机构地区：[1]天津城建大学经济与管理学院,天津300384 [2]天津城建大学生态宜居城市与可持续建设管理研究中心,天津300384

出　　处：《土木工程与管理学报》2019年第1期156-162,共7页Journal of Civil Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71171141);天津市社科规划后期资助项目(TJGLHQ1403);教育部哲学社会科学研究后期资助项目(16JHQ031)

摘　　要：从信息经济学视角来看,既有建筑节能改造市场有序运行是多方主体行为博弈的结果,探索既有建筑节能改造市场多主体行为博弈演化策略具有重要的理论与实践价值。从既有建筑节能改造市场核心三方主体行为策略分析入手,构建了ESCO、政府和业主的三方博弈模型,运用演化博弈理论探讨了三方主体进化稳定策略形成的动态演化过程。研究结果表明,在各方信息不对称条件下,ESCO、政府和业主的三方动态利益博弈并不会固定地收敛于某一个稳定策略集合,其在各自不同概率范围内的不同行为取向均会造成不同收益结果,推动市场健康有序运行需要三方主体共同努力,政府针对ESCO和业主设置合理的补贴与罚金,有效控制不同行为决策下ESCO与业主的损益水平,引导与调动ESCO和业主既有建筑节能改造行为的积极性是关键。From the perspective of information economics,the orderly operation of the existing building energy-saving renovation market is the result of multi-party behavioral game. It is of great theoretical and practical value to explore the multi-agent behavior game evolution strategy of the existing building energy-saving renovation market. Starting from the analysis of the core behaviors of the three parties in the existing building energy-saving renovation market,this paper constructs a three-party game model of ESCO,government and owner,and uses evolutionary game theory to explore the dynamic evolution process of the three-party evolutionary stability strategy. The research results show that under the condition of information asymmetry,the three-party dynamic interest game of ESCO,the government and owners do not converge to a certain stable strategy set,and their different behavioral orientations within different probability ranges will cause different revenue outcomes to promote the healthy and orderly operation of the market,it is necessary for the three parties to work together. The government sets reasonable subsidies and fines for the ESCO and the owners,effectively controls the profit and loss level of the ESCO and the owners under different behavior decisions. It is the key to guide and mobilize the enthusiasm of the ESCO and the owners of the existing building energy conservation transformation.

关 键 词：既有建筑 节能改造 多主体 行为策略 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F205[经济管理—国民经济]