养老驿站PPP模式政府激励制度设计研究——基于博弈视角  

Research on the Design of Government Incentive Mechanism of Community Pension Station PPP Model:From the Perspective of Game Theory

作　　者：杨赞[1] 江谢家宏 樊颖 林晏平 YANG Zan;CHIANG HSIEH ChiaHung;FAN Ying;LIN Yanping(Department of Construction Management,Tsinghua University,Beijing 100084,China)

机构地区：[1]清华大学建设管理系,北京100084

出　　处：《建筑经济》2019年第1期15-20,共6页Construction Economy

基　　金：国家自然科学基金中欧管理科学多边合作项目"居家养老服务模式的优化:实现生活自主;费用可承受和财务可持续"(71461137002)

摘　　要：通过分析养老驿站的建设运营模式,界定政府和社会资本的参与方式,并基于丰台区一家养老驿站的运营情况,构建政府和社会资本参与建设和运营的决策博弈净支出函数,在纳什均衡下分析最优的参与方式以及合同框架,提出激励社会资本参与驿站建设的相关政策建议。This paper analyzes the construction and operation model of community pension station,defines the ways of cooperation of government and social capital. Based on one community pension station in Fengtai district of Beijing,discusses the involvement of the decision-making game of the two parties on the net expenditure functions,analyzes the optimal policy and contract framework under the Nash equilibrium,puts forward relevant policies and suggestions to encourage social capital to participate in the construction of community pension station.

关 键 词：居家养老 社区养老驿站 博弈论 激励制度 

分 类 号：F407.9[经济管理—产业经济]