简政放权的边界及其优化  

The Boundary and Optimization of Streamlining Administration and Delegating Power

作　　者：华生[1,2] 蔡倩[2] 汲铮 HUA Sheng;CAI Qian;JI Zheng(School of Economics and Management of Southeast University,Nanjing 211189,China;Dong Fureng Institute of Economic and Societal Development of Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China;National School of Development at Southeast University,Nanjing 211189,China)

机构地区：[1]东南大学经济管理学院 [2]武汉大学董辅礽经济社会发展研究院 [3]东南大学国家发展与政策研究院

出　　处：《中国工业经济》2019年第2期5-22,共18页China Industrial Economics

摘　　要：党的十八大以来简政放权力度空前,但回顾历史上出现过的反复,我们还不能掉以轻心。简政放权只有合理划定其边界,识别冗余程序与必要行政规则的界限,才能避免历史上"一收就死,一放就乱,乱了再收"的循环,巩固和深化改革成果。为此,本文重新梳理政府行政职能,尝试借助委托代理理论,构建政府—申请者的两层次模型,来探寻简政放权的边界及其优化,并将其拓展为中央政府—地方政府—申请者模型来分析中央政府向地方政府的放权。本文将规则多少作为独立变量引入模型,通过对政府和申请者进行成本收益分析,得出信息不对称前提下,政府为追求社会福利最大化,在提供服务、分配资源时应该如何确定各类规则的最优量。这需要在政府服务职能领域,跟随信息和大数据时代步伐,让信息而非申请对象"跑路",大幅度减少和简化过时的规则和程序,降低制度性交易成本。在政府监管职能领域,根据外部性范围和强弱采取针对性有加有减的监管措施,促进社会总福利的帕累托改进。在政府分配有限准入资源领域,按照规则对信息的可识别度进行程序上的流程再造和深层次解构,舍弃对配置筛选过程中提供无效或过高成本信息的规则。对于中央向地方的放权,在不影响"全国一盘棋"和市场公平竞争的同时,遵循效率优先原则,把因地制宜的规则制定权下放给地方。通过合理精准的简政放权,促进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化。Streamlining administration and delegating power has been mostly carried out in history since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.However the iterations that have occurred in history keep us from taking it lightly.Only by setting the boundaries of streamlining administration and delegating power properly and demarcating redundant procedures and necessary administrative rules,we can consolidate our reform and avoid the vicious circle in history which is that power concentration bringing sluggishness,then delegating causing chaos,then the power has to be took back again.To this end,this paper reorganizes the administrative functions of the government,tries to build a two-level model of government-applicants by means of principal-agent theory,explores the boundary and optimization of the streamlining administration and delegating power and expands it into a central government-local government-applicant model analyzing the power decentralization from central government to local ones.The paper sets the amount of rules as an independent variable and analyzes the cost and benefit of the government and the applicants,then we show that on condition of information asymmetry,how would the government determine the optimal amounts of various kinds of rules when providing services and allocating resources to maximize the social welfare.This requires the government to follow the pace of the information and big data era in the field of government service functions,making information move consistently instead of the applicant,greatly reducing and simplifying outdated rules and procedures,and reducing institutional transaction costs.Also,in the field of government supervision,targeted and flexible regulatory measures should be adopted according to the scope and strength of externalities to promote Pareto improvement of total social welfare;in the field of government allocating limited access resources,procedural process reconstruction and deep deconstruction should be implemented according to the identifiabi

关 键 词：简政放权 委托代理理论 国家治理体系 治理能力现代化 

分 类 号：F120[经济管理—世界经济]