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作 者:王萍 WANG Ping(Law of School, Guangdong University of Finance, Guangzhou Guangdong 510521, China)
出 处:《太原理工大学学报(社会科学版)》2019年第1期62-69,共8页Journal of Taiyuan University of Technology(Social Science Edition)
基 金:广州市哲学社会科学"十三五规划"青年项目(2018GZQN46)
摘 要:IMF与其成员国在经济主权上的关系是研究IMF贷款条件性实际实施效果的基础性问题。IMF贷款条件性所涉范围愈加广泛,除宏观经济领域的改革和调整外,逐渐渗透到微观经济领域改革。IMF贷款条件性在内容上存在忽视个体情况、干涉经济主权缺乏法律依据等问题,易受到发达国家利益输出、潜在货币风险、金融危机外溢等因素的影响。为此,需要尊重成员国对经济主权的"自主性"并使条件性设置成为有关方"利益协调"的产物。The relationship between IMF and its member states in terms of economic sovereignty is a fundamental issue in the study of the actual implementation effect of the conditionality of IMF loans. In addition to macroeconomic reform and adjustment, the conditionality of IMF loans has wider range, gradually penetrating into micro-economic reform. There are some problems in the content of the conditionality of IMF loans, such as ignoring the individual situations, lacking legal basis for interfering in economic sovereignty, and so on. To this end, it is necessary to respect the “autonomy” of Member States to economic sovereignty and to make conditionality the product of the “coordination of interests” of the parties concerned.
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