授权模式下OEM和第三方的生产和回收定价竞争策略  

Producing and Recycle Pricing Competitive Strategies of the OEM and the Third Party under the Authorization Mode

作　　者：杨爱峰[1] 詹倩颖 宋明珠 胡小建[1] YANG Aifeng;ZHAN Qianying;SONG Mingzhu;HU Xiaojian(School of Management,Hefei University of Technology,Hefei 230009,China)

机构地区：[1]合肥工业大学管理学院,安徽合肥230009

出　　处：《工业工程》2019年第1期36-44,共9页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年科学基金资助项目(71301038);教育部人文社会科学基金资助项目(16YJA630017)

摘　　要：假设第三方再制造商(第三方)需要向原始设备制造商(OEM)缴纳授权费才能进行回收再制造,OEM和第三方在正向供应链销售市场与逆向供应链回收市场均存在竞争。文章建立了以双方闭环供应链利润最大化为目标带约束条件的古诺博弈模型,通过K-T条件求出第三方部分再制造和第三方完全再制造两种情形下两企业最优的产品生产量以及废旧品回收价格。最后分别通过解析方法和数值算例分析了单位授权费等参数对决策变量和最优利润的影响。Assuming that the third party remanufacturer (third party) needs to pay the authorization fee to the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) in order to recycle and remanufacture the used items, the OEM and the third party compete in both the forward supply chain sale market and the reverse supply chain recovery market. A Cournot game model is set up with constraints to maximize the closed-loop supply chain profits of both sides. It obtains the optimal production amount and the optimal recovery price of end-of-use products under third party partial remanufacturing and third party completing remanufacturing by using K-T condition. Finally, the influence of the unit authorization fee and other parameters on the decision variables and the optimal profits are analyzed by means of analytical methods and numerical examples.

关 键 词：再制造生产 回收定价 授权 古诺博弈 竞争 

分 类 号：F253[经济管理—国民经济]